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ARTICLES

Sketch of a Philosophy of Joy — ZAKARIA IBRAHIM BOCTOR — 5

Growth in Study of Religion at Columbia University, 1924-1954 — HORACE L. FRIESS — 13

COMMUNICATION

Eighth International Congress for the History of Religions — 38

BOOK REVIEWS

Raffaele Pettazzoni: *La Religione nella Grecia antica* (KURT VON FRITZ) 40

Kenneth W. Morgan, ed.: *The Religion of the Hindus* (KURT F. LEIDECKER) 44

George Weston Briggs: *The Ḍoms and Their Near Relations* (JOHN CLARK ARCHER) 46

Swami Nikhilananda, ed.: *Vivekananda: the Yogas and Other Works* (Nelson S. Bushnell) 49

Heinrich Dumoulin, S. J., tr. by Ruth Fuller Sasaki: *The Development of Chinese Zen after the Sixth Patriarch* (Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki) 52

Nyogen Senzaki and Ruth Strout McCandless: *Buddhism and Zen*
Eugen Herrigel: *Zen in the Art of Archery* (Richard De Martino) 54

Ludwig Köhler: *Der Hebräische Mensch: Eine Skizze* (Ludwig Lewisohn) 58

Dom Gregory Dix: *Jew and Greek: a Study in the Primitive Church* (Ursula M. Niebuhr) 60

Dom Thomas Symons, ed. and tr.: *Regularis Concordia* (Marshall W. Baldwin) 63

T.S.R. Boase: *English Art, 1100-1216* (Marion Lawrence) 65

Evelyn M. Simpson and George R. Potter, eds.: *The Sermons of John Donne,* Vol. VI (Joseph A. Mazzeo) 68

Ira V. Brown: *Lyman Abbott, Christian Evolutionist: A Study in Religious Liberalism* (Joseph Schiffman) 71

Nicolas Berdyaev: *Truth and Revelation* (Paul Ramsey) 73

J. M. Spier, tr. by D. H. Freeman: *Christianity and Existentialism*
F. H. Heinemann: *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament* (Carl Michalson) 75

Roger Lincoln Shinn: *Christianity and the Problem of History* (Howard J. B. Ziegler) 78

Gustav E. Mueller: *Dialectic* (John E. Smith) 80

John Weir Perry, M.D.: *The Self in Psychotic Process* (Gotthard Booth, M.D.) 85

Book Notes 88

Among the Periodicals 104

SKETCH OF A PHILOSOPHY OF JOY

ZAKARIA IBRAHIM BOCTOR

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THE THEME OF "ANGUISH" *(Angst, angoisse)* has become so prominent in the philosophical thought of our time that a philosophy of joy may seem irrelevant. Contemporary philosophers in Europe are more disposed to put the accent on despair, on the underlying unhappiness of human consciousness, or even on the tragic note within existence, than to lay down the foundations of joy, or to investigate the meaning of hope, or to examine the possibility of an experience of "participation." In fact, man is strongly inclined today to dramatize his existence; and philosophers, responding to this impulse, tend to portray this drama in the darker shades, and to move us by accenting the "pathos" of our lives. By contrast, the very notion of a philosophy of joy strikes us at once as a too superficial view of things. Yet the question is bound to arise whether joy is a mere intruder in our lives, or whether it is so far an integral part of our existence that every human life may, in some sense, involve the very solution of its own problem of evil.

Let us affirm, in the first place, that the simple fact of living, all special determinations set aside, is itself a good of the first order. "Even in its purely organic form," writes Louis Lavelle, "life springs, grows, and conserves itself only in virtue of the faith in its intrinsic value which animates it. Hence life often appears, not only as accompanied by a joy peculiar to itself, but also as deserving to be loved and praised, even in its most brutal or trivial demands."[1] In other words, there is a certain primordial joy which seems to be inseparable from every conscious activity. "In the primitive fact of *being conscious*," writes W. E. Hocking, "there is a satisfaction independent of the contents of consciousness. To exist, as being aware of things, able to perceive and judge—this is to enjoy existence."[2] Hence a solidarity of joy and living is possible, because "experience is loaded in advance on the side of good." For a human being, to exist is to enjoy existence, be-

1. *Traité des valeurs*, I (Paris, 1951), 285.
2. *Living Religions and a World Faith* (New York, 1946), p. 217.

cause we judge life on the basis of an immediate experience of that primitive unity of being and value. Pessimism cannot deny the fact that our attachment to life is the very foundation of our existence. "Living and the love of living," says Hocking, "are inseparable, and this prejudice extends to the world as the source of living."[3]

Man may be said to "ex-ist" when he reveals himself, opens himself to the world, realizes himself as a conscious being in the context of a world which is itself real. Now every such conscious opening to the world is accompanied by an existential joy which is the essential basis of all love of life. Primitive man does not raise the problem of the meaning of life, for the simple reason that he finds in life its own justification. His conscious life does not separate itself from that universal life which has in itself its own *raison d'être*. He knows that natural joy in virtue of which one greets his existence with spontaneity, with immediacy, one might say, with *naïveté*. In fact, the joy of primitives is an aboriginal expression of a natural communication with the sources of being. As Gabriel Marcel puts it, "Joy is not the sign, but the very outpouring (*jaillissement*, 'spouting out') of being."[4]

It is, therefore, permissible to say that all experience of being is, to some extent, accomplished in joy. But, more than this, joy envelops in its own radiance our primitive perception of the world so that *sensation* is, in principle, agreeable. Not, certainly, that we dare ignore the fact of suffering, but there is reason to affirm that, for the human being—and only for him—there is a primordial joy in feeling, in perceiving, in touching things. Here lies the basis of that esthetic sense which seems inseparable from our habitual perception of the world; for it belongs to human nature to "contemplate" reality and to draw from one's own experience—as a born artist—an esthetic satisfaction. It is all very well to speak of the necessities of action, but the world always appears to us as an admirable "spectacle" in which we participate continually as much through contemplation as through action. It is because man is endowed with this esthetic interest that he experiences an incomparable joy in "admiring" objects which offer no attraction to the animal.

Here the theme of admiration (on which Marcel has insisted with so much vigor) offers itself for our examination, as throwing light on

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 217 f.
4. *Journal métaphysique* (Paris, 1935), p. 230.

the nature of joy. For, if it is true that admiration implies our participation in something which possesses a markedly spiritual character, the converse is equally true, that whatever is truly spiritual reveals itself to man in a religious experience whose primary characteristic is joy. As Marcel has written, "It belongs to the nature of admiration to tear us away from ourselves, even from the thought of self."[5] By pulling him away from his egocentrism, admiration lifts man above himself by an extraordinary flight which transports him to something other than self, something which has the character of a divine work; it is in this experience that he realizes the joy of an effective participation in the divine. There is, then, a veritable "revelation" in admiration, since it reveals the truth to us, not as a simple "contemplation," but rather as a joy. In fact, truth reveals itself to man with "the triumphal accent" of joy, so that all revelation occurs only in a state of semi-mystical joy.

In this sense, Jean Paul Sartre is right in saying that "the intoxication *(l'ivresse)* of understanding involves always the joy of feeling ourselves responsible for the truths which we discover."[6] But, instead of assuming, with the author of *Being and Nothingness,* that our joy consists in creating these truths in isolation, we affirm rather that the proper work of joy is to reveal to us objective truths essentially other than the self. In this connection, Marcel establishes a happy distinction between self-enjoyment, which is exaltation, but not satisfaction, and joy, which is essentially united to the consciousness of "togetherness" *(un tout-ensemble).*[7] In contrast, Sartre halts at *jouissance,* which is only a bending back upon oneself, a sort of "onanism," according to Marcel's expression.

For our part, we believe that joy has a "communitary" character, and that there is an undeniable joy in what we may call the feeling of "with-ness." It is true that some philosophers are inclined to deny the reality of communication (between consciousnesses), but willy-nilly they must acknowledge that the human being cannot remain a miserable monad entirely closed off in its solipsistic world! For wherever there is division, separation, solitude, there is also suffering, anguish, moroseness. No doubt the chronic engendering of conflict among con-

5. *Du Refus à l'invocation* (Paris, 1948), pp. 67 f.
6. *Situations,* I (Paris, 1947), 315.
7. *Le Mystère de l'être,* II (Paris, 1951), 120.

scious selves is a hard reality, but solitude is the source of deeper suffering; and when a man opens himself to others, he is already beyond *angoisse*. In a sense, we may say that to be "with" others and at their disposition *(disponibile)*, is the characteristic sign of man's moral sanity. "The conversion to truth," says Vladimir Jankélévitch, "knows but one recipe: to put an end to the cramp of egolatry—the turning toward self of an ego fascinated by its own navel—in order that the miserable monad may become again a lover of the human race. In that way only can moroseness give way to joy."[8]

There is another type of joy which seems to accompany, in the life of a human being, every cognitive activity. We know with what joy a child repeats a newly learned word. In this case pleasure itself is, as Hocking puts it, "a mode of being aware of the world."[9] Knowledge, we may say, is, in a sense, a new birth *(connaître, c'est co-naître)*, and it is in joy that this new birth is accomplished. In a sense it seems as if the human being learns only in joy, the joy of opening oneself to a world hitherto unexplored and, by that very fact, of increasing in us the sense of our own being. "Objects are *goods*," says again Hocking, "simply in their character as objects of cognition, whatever their further relations to our purposes may be."[10] It follows that value and cognition are "co-extensive," in Hocking's phrase, in such wise that pain itself, taken simply as intense sensation, is so far good. Here joy seems to be the result of a cognitive vision which clarifies the meaning of a life whose value tends to be obscured by the obstacles encountered. It is only when joy unveils its profound secrets that the problem of evil loses its sharpness, and existence itself discloses to our eyes its unshakable and incomparable value.

However, is it not in "creation" above all that joy achieves the plenitude of its meaning? Certainly cognition and power are two adequate instruments for attaining joy, but it is only to the degree that they make an appeal to human "creativity" that they can beget in us a genuine joy. "Wherever there is joy," says Henri Bergson, "there is creation; the richer the creation, the more profound the joy."[11] Thus creation and action are the two inexhaustible sources

8. *Le Mal* (Grenoble, 1947), p. 98.

9. *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven, 1924), p. 128.

10. "Some Second Principles," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, I (New York, 1930), 398.

11. *L'Energie spirituelle* (Paris, 1922), p. 23.

of joy. Nevertheless, joy transcends infinitely every particular satisfaction. For man finds an ineffable joy in realizing himself in an act which is at once a deliverance and a creation; and this Bergsonian joy is, indeed, bound to the production of a work *(oeuvre)* which is no other than the man himself. But there is still another joy which lies beyond all creation, and whose purity surpasses both that of cognition and of action, and that is mystical joy.

Not, indeed, that it is necessary to renounce all activity finally to achieve it, for joy is in no way an inert and inefficacious principle, but that, on the contrary, it is by remounting to the very source of creativity that we discern in mystical joy the supreme identification of the principle of knowledge and the principle of action. "In joy," writes Lavelle, "activity, being indifferent to all particular ends and oblivious to any ramification into distinct faculties, nourishes itself upon its own exercise. . . . Joy does not differ from the simple presence of the act. For the act can never know failure, since it does not reside in its effect, but in the principle which gives it being."[12] In other words, cognition and action must become disengaged and must lose themselves in this mystical joy which is the supreme good—the only good which is self-sufficient.

Now, is it possible to describe that "joy pure and unmixed" which Bergson has made the very meaning of our life, and which constitutes the definitive state of mind of the mystic? In the first place, it seems that this supreme joy, situated beyond pain and pleasure, is but the sign of a spiritual plenitude of which only the mystical soul is capable. It is the very expression of a "purity" of vision which spontaneously discerns the liaison between being and the reason for being *(raison d'être)*. Some mystics have tried to describe for us that ineffable joy without which human existence would be meaningless. Some of them have attributed to it a marvellous power capable of transforming suffering itself into a source of joy. Thus joy appears to be the prerogative of mystical spirituality, this being an exquisite sensitivity whose freshness and outpouring life continually renew the charm of existence. That is why life appears to certain mystics as inseparable from the joy of living, that divine joy which transcends pleasure and pain and confers meaning on an existence apparently finite and wretched. At any rate, here appears the religious character of joy which the torn

12. *La Présence totale* (Paris, 1934), pp. 248 f.

soul, the distracted mind, the divided being, can never know. "All that is done in joy," in the brilliant words of Marcel, "has a religious value; in joy, that is to say, with the totality of the self. Whereas every division within the soul alienates it from God."[13]

It is obvious from the above that joy means plenitude, fullness, abundance. Pleasure is partial, fragmentary, but joy is always total, indivisible. Happiness, as Hocking "has taught us *pour toujours,*" is unity of spirit, integrity of soul. "To the happy man, things and deeds appear worth while; his actions meet the mark and rebound to enhance his energy for the next stroke; whereas those of the unhappy man strike, if at all, like spent bullets, or shatter, and contribute nothing to his self-continuance. Whatever restores wholeness in action restores happiness."[14] Modern man suffers from an inability to find singleness in his goods, rational unity in his aims; herein lies the germ of the malaise of modernity. In a world of specializations, abstractions, divisions, modern man seems to have lost that primitive sense of life, that initial integrity without which human existence is stricken with absurdity. And it is precisely the role of religion, considered as, fundamentally, a return to the global and to communication with the Whole, to restore in man that lost sense. Man has to recover his primitive joy; and that can be achieved only at the cost of a sacrifice of certain specializations and divisions. To break with partial pleasures is to return, in some measure, to the source of all values and to the supreme principle of all happiness. It is only when man seeks to associate himself with the *total Good,* by transcending a life absorbed in partial interests, that he can really know that divine joy.

It can be objected to all we have said that no return to primitive life is possible for modern man, and, indeed, existence is no longer a natural, evident, and self-justifying fact for man. Our present attitude toward the universe has little or no relation to that spontaneous life for which the real requires no justification. Nevertheless, for us as for the primitive, value seems to be inherent in the real, in such wise that no one has the right to discredit "being" in the name of "value" (as some philosophies are now attempting to do). We dare not forget that value itself is but a mode of being, since it arises in the very bosom of reality. In other words, *being is the foundation* of value.

13. *Journal métaphysique,* p. 230.
14. *The Meaning of God in Human Experience,* p. 492.

And it is only by making this primordial solidarity of being and value the starting point that a philosophy of joy can lay the basis for its optimism and its faith in being.

We shall, no doubt, be reproached for having attributed to joy a metaphysical status, if not even a quasi-mystical reality, whereas, in fact (it will be said), what we are dealing with is simply a more or less fugitive state of mind. To this we are prepared to answer that, unless freedom itself is fugitive, joy is not fugitive, for, *in so far as man is free,* all of his activity is, or may be, accompanied by joy. "The sign of the free man," writes Lavelle, "is his power to make joy coincide with his most habitual activity."[15] We may go further and say that wherever there is liberty there is joy. Those who so strongly stress the unhappy consciousness forget that, even if there is *angoisse* in the exercise of choice, still the achievement of the free act is in joy. For to be free is to prove oneself a power among powers, a power capable of operating within what is, and hence of sharing in the life of being which triumphs over all obstacles. Far from remaining alone in his liberty, man can realize himself only in an act of "participation" which reunites him with that pure Liberty on which he depends and toward which he tends.

But what are we to make of the prevalent doctrine that it is precisely our liberty which is the specific source of anguish? We know how Kierkegaard saw in liberty an awareness of anguish through the stress of personal responsibility for the crucial choice that determines one's destiny, a destiny which the chooser alone has the power to accomplish. This conception involves an unjustified and one-sided dramatization of freedom. The man who chooses "creates himself," as Sartre expresses it, and it is only in joy that such creation of self is realized. Certainly, liberty in choice accepts a responsibility whose gravity is measured by the weight of the decision, but this responsibility also includes the joy of living to realize our destiny. "Anguish," writes Lavelle, "is but the negative face of that emotion which we may call the emotion of existence, and which has also a positive face."[16] Let us say that anguish itself confesses a love of life, and that, in this central and indomitable love of life, there is an activity which continually reaffirms, which may thus be said to create itself and so to generate continuously its char-

15. *La Conscience de soi* (Paris, 1946), p. 113.
16. *Traité des valeurs,* I, 284.

acteristic value. At bottom, man exists and can only exist through a persisting act of *hope,* which expresses his living faith in the value of existence.

It remains true—and this is our severest test—that freedom contains the possibility of the denial or rejection of freedom itself—the experience of ultimate despair. This possibility cannot itself be rejected, for it is the price, the necessary price—the ransom, so to speak—we must pay for being the sole deciders of our destiny. Marcel himself, the reverse of a prophet of despair, has said that despair is always possible, and under many forms.[17] But it is also always possible to triumph over despair, and precisely through an act of freedom which discovers the value beneath the obdurate fact, and holds unshakably to the denouement in joy. It is easy, no doubt, to deny the reality of this mystical experience of joy, but it remains to be proved that "absurdity" is really the last word of experience, or that "anxiety" is the ultimate fact of our existence. For the absurd is in no sense an objective datum; it is a quality which exists only as we choose its existence. But one may ask if it does not indicate a voluntary blindness *(un aveuglement volontaire)* in the face of a world where values never cease to emerge, even within our acts of rejection. But just because of this freedom to blind oneself, we may say that hope and joy are not *data,* as pure gifts of nature—they are rather the ultimate conquests of a creative liberty whose function it is to realize the ideal and (in a legitimate sense) to idealize the real.

Thus, a philosophy of joy declares itself, in the end, as *a resolute affirmation of existence and of liberty.* For what is freedom but the very process in which man realizes the identity between existence and value? And it is only as man succeeds in realizing this subtle identity that he is able to break through the initial and insistent solitude of his intimate subjectivity. In the last analysis, let us say that joy consists in a sense of oneself *with* "the Other" *(l'Autre):* with oneself even as another, with the neighbor even as another self, with the world as an object common to myself and the others, with God as the Absolute Other who ceaselessly creates me. And it is always in joy that man opens himself to the Other, for this opening expresses the intrinsic joy of living.

17. *Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique* (Louvain, 1949), p. 66.

GROWTH IN STUDY OF RELIGION AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 1924-1954

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Editor, The Review of Religion

TO CLAIM THE LIMITED SPACE OF THIS REVIEW for a fanfare of purely local interest would grieve our Editor's conscience. In order to write this article, I have, therefore, had to convince myself that there is a wide representative significance in the efforts at Columbia University that I propose to discuss. Since I have already had this conviction for more than twenty years, it has not been difficult to give it expression now. Columbia's Bicentennial year offers a suitable occasion to tell a story that has not yet been told, and that belongs to the cultural history of our times. For the problems, issues, and values at stake in developments at this center of learning have been more or less typical of a general human condition.

One could, indeed, sub-divide the thirty years under consideration into three shorter periods marked off by a reference to world events. It is possible to distinguish, first, some ten or more years as a post-Wilsonian period of self-determined liberalism. In this time Protestant thought, at least in the United States, very largely continued to take a progress of liberal culture for granted. There followed, in the time of Hitler's regime, a violent totalitarian challenge. And, during the 'thirties, a religious critique and questioning of cultural norms, such as had already appeared earlier in European thought, began to find influential expression in this country also. The period in which we have been living, since the end of World War II, amid much confusion and alarm, is one which I find it meaningful to call a period of re-association, or at least of significant world-wide efforts at re-association in virtually all human societies. In this time much religious thought both here and abroad has shown a renewed confessional emphasis.

No theory of determination need be implied in making use of these distinctions, beyond the fact that religious and philosophical developments in each period had characteristics which gave them position in relation to the general changes in mankind's affairs.

TWO PROGENITORS

The starting-point of this story is somewhat arbitrarily chosen. I wish to write from personal experience, and my own involvement in these events, as an active participant, dates from about 1925. But essential things have always happened before one's own arrival on the scene. In the present case many early essentials are connected with the influence of two strikingly different members of the Columbia University Faculty. Both are no longer living. They worked quite independently of each other, and would no doubt be surprised at the extent to which some of their fruits have been combined in the subsequent work of certain younger colleagues. The first of these men was Dr. Raymond Collyer Knox (1876-1952), who came to Columbia in 1908 as the first resident Chaplain of the University. The second was Dr. Wendell T. Bush (1866-1941), Professor of Philosophy, who first came to Columbia in 1905. I am not aware that they have ever been mentioned together as collaborators before now!

Raymond C. Knox took his B.D. at Union Theological Seminary after studies at Columbia, Berlin, and Oxford. In these schools he became deeply convinced that an historical study of the Bible, with the full aid of modern critical scholarship, should be an important part of a liberal education. When he became Chaplain at Columbia in 1908, he suggested to the Faculty of Columbia College that a course, carrying academic credit, be devoted to a scholarly study of the Bible. Approval was given after the Committee on Instruction were "assured of the scholarly nature and content of the course proposed, and of its freedom from denominational bias, so that it could be profitably taken by students without infringement upon their personal religious affiliations." Caution with regard to these same points seems to have delayed the instituting of the same kind of course, also given by Chaplain Knox, at Barnard College until 1915. It is, of course, important that college faculties be sensitively respectful of personal religious freedom. But it is also culturally significant that such considerations should so long retard the acceptance as a part of general education of historical study of the Bible. Chaplain Knox was one of the most sensible and effective proponents of such study throughout his teaching career. If courses in Bible study with critical, historical methods are now embodied in the curriculum of most liberal colleges, one should not forget that this ground

had to be won, against both religious and secular resistance, within the present century.

Wendell T. Bush was one of the most unusual personalities in the University. He was a man of the world, who combined a truly experimental and democratic spirit with esthetic tastes that were catholic and at the same time ultra-refined. His philosophical orientation owed much to William James and George Santayana at Harvard, to John Dewey's "instrumentalism," and to positivist emphasis on empirical science. His favorite interest came to be the imaginative aspects of culture, as found in folk cultures and in the historical traditions, all of which he wanted to explore and appreciate as exactly as possible in respect to both their immediate and functional values. In his time the courses of instruction in Philosophy at Columbia were listed in an Announcement that also included those in Psychology and Anthropology. This suited Bush's sense of reality admirably. Together with F. J. E. Woodbridge he founded and edited *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,* and again this comprehensive title is significant.

From 1917 on Professor Bush frequently gave a little course, most often in Barnard College, supplementing his courses in Esthetics, in Plato, and in Contemporary Philosophy, with the title "Philosophy of Religion." He did not especially like the title, because it suggested to him the "idealistic" tradition in philosophy with its dialectical arguments to prove that "the eternal values" have a feathered nest in the whole of things. Personally he had no conviction of that sort. But he was impressed by the fact that every human society had its "world of imagination," and he was convinced that one could not understand either its functioning or its feeling of life without a good appreciative understanding of this imaginative world. He shunned the conventional textbooks of more or less apologetic hue, and introduced his students in the "philosophy of religion" to a wealth of historical and anthropological literature—also, to photographs and objects of ceremonial art. He used to tell them "religion is a very important part of the world of imagination that functions socially, and its verbal expressions represent only a small fraction of it."

Professor Bush's pedagogic purpose was not to spread or to buttress his own evaluations, but to stimulate well-informed inquiry and appreciation. His sophistication and whimsicality puzzled many. But those

who stayed around him, whatever their differences in particular conclusions, experienced a remarkable liberation of mind and a preparation to use all modern scholarly resources to the full in studying the arts, philosophies, religions—the imaginative heritage—of mankind. Among the younger scholars at Columbia who had the benefit of this experience with Dr. Bush were Sterling P. Lamprecht (who went to teach at Amherst College), Herbert W. Schneider, Irwin Edman, Horace L. Friess, Marguerite B. Block, and Marian W. Smith, all of whom had some part in the further story I am to tell. The last named, Dr. Smith, went from philosophical studies to professional work in Anthropology under Ruth Benedict, who taught distinguished courses in Mythology and Primitive Religions at this time. This calls to mind again Dr. Bush's influence in directing all his students to the important data of cultural anthropology, which impressed him as indispensable to a scientific study of religion and philosophy.

1924-1935

Returning now to the role of Chaplain Knox, in 1926-27 he had the satisfaction of bringing to the University a bequest of half a million dollars, known as the William C. Schermerhorn Memorial Fund. And he was able to convince the Advisory Board on Religion that a large part of the income from this fund should be regularly devoted to strengthening and enlarging the instructional program in the field of religion. Within the next few years this decision was implemented (1) by establishing several new undergraduate courses in the study of religion in both Columbia and in Barnard College; (2) by instituting a series of public lectures known as the Schermerhorn Lectures in Religion, to be given by distinguished scholars; and (3) by establishing a Professorship in Religion, with the object of designating some professor who could assemble more fully the interdepartmental resources of the University for the study of religion.

SCHERMERHORN LECTURES IN RELIGION

The second of these provisions, for public lectures, led to the following Schermerhorn Lecture appointments and publications in the period from 1927 to 1934.

Winter 1927 — Professor Clarence H. Hamilton, as Visiting Lecturer on Oriental Religions. Materials which he prepared at this time were later published as *Buddhism in India, Ceylon, China, and Japan; a reading Guide* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

Spring 1928 — Professor Kenneth J. Saunders lectured on aspects of Buddhism and Indian religions, as Visiting Lecturer on Oriental Religions.

1928 1929 — Visiting Professor Hervey DeWitt Griswold lectured on historical and contemporary aspects of Hinduism; published, in part, as *Insights into Modern Hinduism* (New York: Henry Holt, 1934).

Winter 1929 — Visiting Professor Vittorio D. Macchioro lectured on the history of Orphism; published as *From Orpheus to Paul* (New York: Henry Holt, 1930).

Spring 1931 — Professor Salo Wittmayer Baron lectured on Jewish Society and Religion in their Historical Interrelations; published as *A Social and Religious History of the Jews,* 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937; 2nd edition, revised and much enlarged, 1952).

Spring 1933 — Professor Irwin Edman lectured on the mind of St. Paul; published as *The Mind of Paul* (New York: Henry Holt, 1935).

1934 — Professor Herbert W. Schneider lectured on types of religious cult current in California. The principal study was later published as: Herbert W. Schneider and George Lawton, *A Prophet and a Pilgrim: Being the Incredible History of Thomas Lake Harris and Laurence Oliphant* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).

H. W. SCHNEIDER'S AMERICAN RELIGION STUDIES

Among the younger Columbia professors interested in this entire program, by far the most resourceful to plan and forward its development was Herbert Wallace Schneider, of the Department of Philosophy. Without his leaving that Department, the new Professorship in Religion was assigned to him in 1928. His fertile mind and abundant energy were creative factors in almost all the ensuing measures to be described. Among the first things he promptly instituted was a graduate seminar devoted to the study of religious movements in American culture. A book of his on *The Puritan Mind* was published by Henry Holt in 1930. And the same publishers in the next few years brought out an American Religion Series, comprising the following doctoral studies by students under Professor Schneider's guidance.

Alvin B. Kuhn, *Theosophy: a Modern Revival of Ancient Wisdom* (New York: 1930).

Altman K. Swihart, *Since Mrs. Eddy* (New York: 1931).

Joseph Haroutunian, *Piety Versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology* (New York: 1932).

Marguerite B. Block, *The New Church in the New World. A Study of Swedenborgianism in America* (New York: 1932).

George Lawton, *The Drama of Life after Death. A Study of the Spiritualist Religion* (New York: 1932).

G. Adolf Koch, *Republican Religion: The American Revolution and the Cult of Reason* (New York: 1933).

Jacob J. Sessler, *Communal Pietism among Early American Moravians* (New York: 1933).

In later years still other American studies by Schneider's students followed this group. As examples, there may be mentioned:

John A. Hutchinson, *We Are Not Divided. A Critical and Historical Study of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America* (New York: Round Table Press, 1941).

Daniel D. Williams, *The Andover Liberals. A Study in American Theology* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1941).

Continuing his American studies with the help of another student, Dr. Joseph L. Blau, who had become a colleague, Professor Schneider produced *A History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946). At the same time Dr. Blau was launched on his own extensive researches and numerous contributions to the history of religious and philosophical thought in America. Among his works in this field are:

American Philosophic Addresses, 1700-1900 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946); *Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy* (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947); *Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949); *Men and Movements in American Philosophy* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952).

NEW UNDERGRADUATE COURSES

The aforementioned happenings took place chiefly in the Graduate School of the University. But simultaneously, and indeed from 1925 on, a development of undergraduate instruction in the field of religion took place both in Columbia and in Barnard College. Chaplain Knox had, even much earlier, enlisted various members of the Union Theological Seminary Faculty in giving an undergraduate course to supplement his own course in the Bible. It was generally called "Fundamentals of Re-

ligion," and the theology professors who gave it, from time to time (William Adams Brown, F. J. Foakes Jackson, George Knox, A. C. McGiffert, and others) were a distinguished group. Apparently they did not entirely succeed, however, in sufficiently emerging from a professional perspective to catch the imagination of undergraduates, so as to build an effective college course. In 1924 the Chaplain decided that, in the person of Professor Schneider, the Columbia College Faculty had a man whose ability and interests might accomplish this. His confidence was not misplaced. And it was really at this point that the stimulus coming from Raymond Knox first began to mingle, in the work of some younger men, with the other stimulus coming from Wendell Bush.

Irwin Edman, Horace L. Friess, and Herbert W. Schneider now joined in offering several new courses for undergraduates. In Columbia College these three members of the Philosophy Department together developed and gave a "Philosophy of Religion" course *(Philosophy 71-72)* that aimed to present much more abundant concrete material for discussion and interpretation than such courses then generally did. The basic intention was neither indoctrination nor, in fact, an exclusive emphasis on doctrines, but rather "to extend the student's acquaintance with the world's sacred writings, religious practices, religious art, and religious ideas, and to study the nature and function of these in human experience." It was hoped to make a dent on the widely prevalent ignorance and provincialism of most of the students, and to open a living and reflective interest in the world of religion in its actual scope and variety.

From 1926 to 1947 an essentially similar undergraduate course was given in the Religion Department of Barnard College, under the title "A study of religions" *(Religion 3-4)* by Professor Friess. Perhaps a special feature in this course was the amount of attention given to the Oriental religions, because there was almost no other provision for study of the historic cultures of Asia in the undergraduate curriculum at that time. For a number of years, 1926 to 1945, Professor Friess also offered a course *(Philosophy 171-172)* of this type for graduate students and others in what was then called University Extension.

In Columbia College a senior seminar was also instituted, in which particularly interested students could discuss and investigate special aspects of religion with the help of a group of professors. Among those

taking active part with Professors Schneider and Friess, for a number of years, was Professor Salo W. Baron, Professor of Jewish History. These courses, and many others not yet mentioned (in Teachers College and in Union Theological Seminary), were listed together and described in a special Announcement which Columbia University issued in 1927 under the title, Courses in Religion, to show the new scope of its offerings in that field.

Outlines originally prepared for the descriptive parts of the new undergraduate course, instituted by Columbia College in 1925 in "Philosophy of Religion," were gradually elaborated, with the research assistance of several advanced graduate students, by Professor Schneider and Friess, to be published in 1932 in their book, *Religion in Various Cultures* (New York: Henry Holt). The text was generously illustrated with reproductions and photographs, in large part taken from a collection made by Professor Bush. The book was dedicated to Wendell T. Bush, and he took pleasure in it, especially in its title and in the pictures!

THE BUSH COLLECTION OF RELIGION AND CULTURE

Over many years Professor Bush had been assembling a unique collection illustrating the symbols and instruments of historic religions and folk traditions in all parts of the world. Until 1935 the basic collection remained in his home, and the objects or photographs traveled up to his esthetics and "philosophy of religion" classes a few at a time in a suitcase. One never knew just what Dr. Bush would pull out of his bags next: certainly, numerous photographs of ancient and medieval shrines, and perhaps a polished stone ax, an icon, an African ivory, a ceremonial robe, mask, or spoon, and then, too, a fashion plate from *Vogue,* a fishing reel or modern kitchen gadgets, and some prints of contemporary painting and architecture. The purpose was to exhibit many different immediate and functional values, and to become educated in "the world of imagination," its continuity and differences in various societies. Professor Bush wanted his students to see and to handle the evidence. His empiricism stressed the importance of "educating the senses," and of not becoming enslaved to purely verbal and dialectical distinctions.

By 1935 Dr. Bush's collection was quite extensive, and he was persuaded by the interest of younger colleagues to project his vision into the future by giving a large part of his illustrative materials to Columbia

University. Since that time his gourd rattles, kachina dolls, masks, medicine bundles, sand-painting reproductions, Buddha images, and priest robes have been on view in Room 401, Low Memorial Library. The attractive design of the exhibition cases and other equipment in this room was furnished to the University carpenters in detail by Professor Schneider. Dr. Marguerite B. Block was appointed Curator of the Collection, and subsequently became also Associate in Religion, in the Department of Philosophy.

When Professor Bush gave his Collection to the University, in 1935, it included about eight thousand lantern slides and an equal number of photographs. These, more than the ceremonial objects displayed, were the core of the Collection, which is intended and is used for purposes of instruction and research rather than for exhibition. Dr. Bush's collections of Greek, Near-Eastern, West European, and primitive culture materials were especially full and useful. From time to time there have been significant additions, notably of Indian and Buddhist materials, through acquisitions from the collections of such visiting scholars as Hervey D. Griswold, Henry R. Zimmer, and George W. Briggs. Most of the materials were indexed for study by Dr. Marguerite Block, Dr. Marian W. Smith, and others. Professor Gladys Reichard organized much of the Navajo sand-painting collection, which is one of the four largest in existence, covering quite well the rituals of the Shooting Chant, the Wind Chant, and the Hail Chant.

1933-1944

There was a continuity of development, but also a profound change during these years of our story. New minds, a new climate of ideas, a new world situation made their appearance.

In the summer of 1933 I spent a few weeks in Germany to see how some academic friends were situated since Hitler's advent to power. In Marburg I talked with Rudolf Otto and Heinrich Frick, and, incidentally, I saw something of the fine collection which Otto had gathered to illustrate the historical development of religion in various cultures. Chaplain Knox, who had seen it in the previous year, had given us an enthusiastic report of its value for the same kinds of study we were fostering at Columbia with the aid of the Bush Collection. The Religionskundliche Sammlung at Marburg was indeed a splendid one, and I

can still recall several items vividly, although I have not seen them since. But an equally strong impression remains from a chance conversation with a young student, a stranger, whom I met in the town. When I mentioned my interest in Otto's historical collection, he burst out with some vehemence: "Oh, we have no time now for that sort of thing. We are making contemporary history again now."

A few weeks later I was walking up and down the railroad station platform in Heidelberg with Paul Tillich. We had arranged to meet there to discuss some questions raised in his mind by the invitation he had received to migrate to the United States and to accept a post at Union Theological Seminary. Fortunately I was able to help him deal with some of his doubts.

The coming to America in the 'thirties of Germans like Tillich, Wilhelm Pauck, and others, no doubt accelerated and strengthened a process of thought already under way here. It was in 1932 that Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* appeared, and the same decade saw a series of other influential writings from his pen. Protestant thinking was taking a new turn, and in Europe, indeed, had been doing so since the close of World War I. It is not possible to describe the trend with a single label, for it has presented a number of important facets. It brings a religious critique of culture and society, appealing to transcendent grounds and calling upon individuals to stand out with courage in the issues of the day for an existence with ultimate—and not just conventional—meaning. It seeks to restore a living and faithful grip upon central insights and teachings of the Bible, which it regards as interpreting life more deeply than do modern rationalism and experimentalism. It seeks to reinvigorate theological thinking as dealing with a fuller truth than can be reached by an anthropocentric humanism. These tendencies are frequently referred to as "neo-orthodox," but none of the labels that are in use is completely happy.

The conflicts and revolutionary changes in life today have surely brought a fresh need to achieve depth and strength of conviction as to basic values. But there is no less need for judgment and circumspect study of what ails us and of what is to be done. If a transcendent critique of society and culture has timely appeal, an immanent understanding of its processes on which to base relevant changes and inventions would seem no less pertinent. The cultural and non-cultural fac-

tors that make for human significance are not piled on each other like stories of a building, but are intimately and everywhere interwoven. An attempt to recover a theological orthodoxy, without preparation for creative designing through the whole web of our life, might well symptomize a hardening of the arteries in our civilization. The sad disillusionment of European religious thinkers over their cultural glories and predicaments is surely understandable, but we must not forget that much of religion in the United States has often been exceptionally naïve and spare in its cultural perspectives. A deepening of spirit would do us good, now and always. But the present world scene hardly suggests that it should be sought apart from a better understanding of social experience in different areas of the world, or expected to come exclusively from one historic tradition.

It is a responsibility of the academic profession to be guardians of critical inquiry and circumspect judgment. There can be growth through the fact that the ideas of our theological heritage are being pronounced again with new vigor since the 'thirties. But it is not a fact that gives our universities ground to relax or diminish their attention to other aspects of the study of religion—historical, psychological, and social—that can be so meaningfully pursued today. And in the Columbia University program, during the last two decades, in addition to the fresh stimulus coming from the Seminaries, there has been a continuity of attention to these other aspects, with indeed some new phases of study added.

ACLS LECTURES ON HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

In 1936 the American Council of Learned Societies constituted a Committee on the History of Religions, in part to revive the work of an earlier American Committee for Lectures on the History of Religions. This earlier committee had since the 'nineties sponsored a distinguished series of lectures, which was interrupted in 1916 during World War I. Both Professors Herbert Schneider and Horace Friess have served as officers of the new ACLS Committee, and in that capacity have arranged for the giving of the following sets of lectures at various American institutions. Columbia University has always been one of the institutions where these lectures were given, and in each case the Columbia University Press has undertaken the publication of the lec-

tures in this new series. The Haskell Lectures Committee of Chicago University has also given generous support. Thus far, the new series of Lectures on the History of Religions has included:

1938 Martin P. Nilsson, lectures published as *Greek Popular Religion* (New York: 1940).
1946 Henri Frankfort, lectures published as *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (New York: 1948).
1950 Wing-tsit Chan, lectures published as *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: 1953).
1952 Louis Massignon, lectures on "Islamic Mysticism" not yet published.

"THE REVIEW OF RELIGION"

By co-operating with the ACLS Committee in offering such lectures on the History of Religions, Columbia University was continuing the kind of public lecture service to which its own Schermerhorn Fund had been giving support since 1928. With the new arrangement, allowing for co-operation with other institutions in this service, it now seemed possible to apply some of the Schermerhorn funds to other projects. It seemed, both to Professor Schneider and to Chaplain Knox, that there was place in the United States for a new journal, devoted to comprehensive and scholarly study in the field of religion. The idea proved even more timely than had been foreseen. It not only anticipated correctly a rising interest of American scholars in writing for such a journal, but provided a medium for many from abroad who had either been displaced or deprived of customary channels of communication by political circumstances. During lean and ill years for European scholarly publications, the new journal acquired an international significance perhaps more speedily than it might have under other circumstances.

The Review of Religion began publication in 1936, as a quarterly appearing in November, January, March, and May. The editor from 1936 to 1943 was Raymond C. Knox; since then, Horace L. Friess. Marguerite B. Block has been Secretary and Managing Editor throughout, and has in detail guided each number through the press. Professor Schneider, a prime mover in starting *The Review,* was for several years Associate Editor, and among those whose valuable advice on the Editorial Board has been appreciated, for many years, are: Salo W. Baron, Joseph L. Blau, Louis H. Gray, Arthur Jeffery, Clarence A.

Manning, Ralph Marcus, Cyril C. Richardson, David E. Roberts, and Ryusaku Tsunoda.

As leading policies the Editors have (1) taken religion in all its various forms and relations to life and culture as the broad field of *The Review*. We have wanted to foster a medium for the informed examination of this whole domain from many points of view. We have not wanted to add to the number of journals already devoted to some particular variety of or viewpoint on religion. Furthermore, we decided (2) to devote ample space, about half of each number, to reviews of books; (3) to maintain an extensive exchange list with other periodicals, throughout the world, and to print in each number a classified list of the more interesting articles they carry; and (4) to stay on the highest levels of scholarly and critical competence.

The result has been, we believe, a splendid and delightful luxury! Frequent citation and favorable comment reach us from far and near, but subscriptions remain largely confined to libraries. Perhaps because of our very comprehensive orbit, we are not a "necessity" for any particular group, either of scholars or confessors. In short, *The Review of Religion,* in its contents, succeeds in typifying that concern for the variety of the subject under study which has characterized the Columbia program we are describing. The survey of current literature in our book reviews and periodical listings has been outstandingly useful. But it is noteworthy also that, besides our critical reviews, we have been privileged to offer articles of distinction by experts in such different fields as: art and religion; psychology and religion; society and religion; contemporary religious movements; contemporary religious and philosophical thought; ancient Near-Eastern religions; Old and New Testament; Judaism; Greek and Roman religion; Christianity, Eastern and Western; Chinese religions and Far Eastern Buddhism; Hinduism; Islam; religion in primitive cultures.

By way of example, a few titles of indicative articles may be listed, although many unmentioned articles are of equal interest and importance. Roman numerals refer to the volumes of *The Review of Religion.*

Among the articles in Volume I were: "Christianity and Islam: Past and Present," by Carl H. Becker; "Religious Values of Contemporary Indian Nationalism," by Nicol Macnicol; "From Marxism to Sophiology," by Sergius Bulgakov.

Articles on Jewish Mysticism, by Gershon Scholem (II and XIV); "The Atti-

tude of the Ancient World toward Judaism," by Isaak Heinemann (IV); "The Beginning of the National Idea," by Martin Buber (VIII).

"The Chinese View of Immortality," by Derk Bodde (VI); "The Concept of Tao in Chinese Culture," by Chung-yuan Chang (XVIII); "Han Yü and the Buddha's Relic," by Homer H. Dubs (XI); "Enlightenment," by Daisetz T. Suzuki (XVIII).

"Greek Prayers," by Kurt Von Fritz (X); "The Psychological Background of Late Greek Paganism," by Martin P. Nilsson (XI); "An Interpretation of Eastern European Mentality," by Endré Ivanka (XIV); "Brythonic Christianity," by Louis H. Gray (VII).

Articles by Paul Tillich (III, IX, X, XIII); review articles on works of Kierkegaard, by David E. Roberts (III, VIII, X, XIII).

Among the illustrated articles are: "The Hindu View of World History according to the Purāṇas," (VI) and "Śrī-Yantra and Śiva-Trimūrti," (VIII), by Henry R. Zimmer; "The Cult of the Cretan Caves," by Spyridon Marinatos (V); "The Bamberg Rider," by Otto Von Simson (IV); "Grünewald's Christianity," by Stephen S. Kayser (V).

Volume XIII includes a symposium on Religion and Democracy; and Volumes X and XIII, symposia on Religion and Health, in each case from the University Seminar on Religion, described below on page 32.

1943-1954

The deeper human consequences of what was happening in the world at this time will take a while to emerge. We say the contrived splitting of atoms now ushered in "the atomic age." In the world of human relations, however, this time is marked by conspicuous efforts at re-association in many societies to counteract long trends of uncontrolled disintegration, and to secure, if possible, a social basis for productive control of man's new resources and powers. In some countries these re-associative efforts have involved violent revolutions and conflicts; but elsewhere and everywhere they go on insistently. A great need for newly trained professional leadership, in considerable volume, is characteristic of this situation. In the United States, which has been catapulted into large scale responsibilities, but indeed wherever great changes are in progress, this need is felt.

Our world situation calls for severe retraining of leading personnel in a hard, but also in a creative sense. One looks for alertness and openness to new conditions and horizons, for resourceful inventive capacity. One looks—not only by the crude methods of "investigations"

and secret police—for dependability and disciplined responsibility. Amid the strain of it all, some people feel that it is most important to devote themselves to what is convincingly meaningful with a new moral and spiritual strength.

It would be foolish to claim that the University developments about to be described constitute an answer, except perhaps in very small part, to this world situation and its needs. But, in any case, it is within this common perspective of our times that they exist and find some of their significance.

AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL PH.D. PROGRAM

In 1943 Columbia University decided to offer graduate studies leading to the Ph.D. degree "in the field of religion." Before that year doctoral theses, for instance, the American religion studies supervised by Professor Schneider as mentioned earlier in this account, had been undertaken under the regulations for the Ph.D. in the Department of Philosophy. Those regulations gave generous opportunity for students to take courses at Union Theological Seminary and to obtain the assistance of that Faculty in their research. But each arrangement of this kind was an individual one. In 1943 it appeared desirable to make more extensive and general provision for graduate studies in the field of religion, and it was decided not to place these studies under the jurisdiction of any one Department. Instead, an interdepartmental—in fact, an inter-Faculty—committee was set up, like several others already operating under the "Joint Committee on Graduate Instruction." The Dean of the Graduate Faculties (Professor Pegram and subsequently Professor Krout) himself acted as Chairman of the new committee. Professor Schneider became its first Executive Secretary, being succeeded later on by Professor Friess. Other members of the committee were from the Faculty of Union Theological Seminary and from several Departments (including History, Philosophy, and Semitic Languages) of the University. It was decided by the committee to provide for doctoral studies in four sub-fields, namely: (1) History of Religion, (2) Literature of Religion (mainly, Bible), (3) Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, (4) Religion and Society.

This entire arrangement was motivated by a notably increased interest in the study of religion, and by the aim to provide a more varied program than any one branch of the University could undertake. In ten

years Columbia has admitted over two hundred and twenty students to this program, and by now seventy-two of these have received the Ph.D. degree. The progress of candidates is slowed by the fact that many of them have teaching, or ministerial, or still other jobs. Those applying for admission to these studies have nearly all had considerable training and experience beyond the A.B. level. Indeed, over eighty per cent of them at Columbia also have the B.D. degree, and many of them come with various Master's (M.A., S.T.M.) degrees. Some have come because they were awakened by war experience to the value of fuller preparation for more meaningful roles in life. The government's educational aid to G.I.'s made it possible for many of these to extend their studies. A new consciousness of international and intercultural relations has been a definite stimulus in the work of some of these students. For all of them the sense that philosophical and religious ideas and values were being fundamentally reconsidered has been important.

It has been an able and exciting group of students with which to work. Because of the fact that Columbia University was not building a new staff for this program, but was involving existing personnel already busy in various fields, the number of students admitted had to be severely limited. This made for the selection of highly qualified candidates. The same policy meant that the faculty engaged in this work were men who brought to it an exceptional interest and willingness. In the various fields of the program, special responsibilities for the guidance of students were assumed as follows, in (1) *History of Religion* by Professors Arthur Jeffery and Horace Friess at Columbia, Professors John McNeill and recently Wilhelm Pauck at Union Seminary in Church History; (2) *Literature of Religion* by Professors Frederick C. Grant and James Muilenburg at the Seminary, Salo W. Baron and Arthur Jeffery at Columbia; (3) *Philosophy of Religion and Ethics* by Professors Herbert Schneider and Horace Friess at Columbia, David E. Roberts and others at the Seminary; (4) *Religion and Society* by Professors Reinhold Niebuhr and John Bennett at the Seminary, Salo W. Baron, Herbert Schneider, and others at the University. For several reasons there developed, at the beginning, a rather heavy concentration of students in the Philosophy of Religion division, but gradually a more desired distribution among the several branches of study is being achieved.

Columbia is far from being alone among American universities, and

is not the first of them to have offered a Ph.D. program in the field of religion. Awareness of the spread of such programs led, in 1947, to the formation of a somewhat informal Council on Graduate Studies in Religion, of which Professor Frederick C. Grant is the President. This Council now includes representatives of some seventeen institutions in the United States and Canada that "confer the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Religion." These representatives have met at least once each year to discuss "standards and methods of graduate study in the field of religion." Several years ago the Council set up a committee, with Professor E. E. Aubrey as Chairman, to make an inventory of the doctoral theses accepted under the various programs for the Ph.D. in Religion, since 1940. The National Council on Religion in Higher Education co-operated in this investigation, and, aided by a grant from The Hazen Foundation, its results will be published in a special Supplementary Number of *The Review of Religion,* due to appear in the autumn of 1954. A reading of this material shows not only the kinds of study that have been forwarded in these doctoral programs, but the authors' names, in many cases, give indication of a new group of younger scholars and teachers who are becoming an articulate factor in American thought and education.

In the Columbia program, however the students specialize their studies, they have generally taken opportunity to attend the lectures of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at the Seminary. Most of them also profit by the lectures in the History of Philosophy, given at Columbia by Professor John H. Randall Jr. It was found that a common weakness in preparation for advanced study of religion, among American students, lay in their meager knowledge of the history of religions. In order to deal with this a new course was instituted, which virtually all the doctoral candidates in the field of religion take. It bears the imposing title "Critical introduction to the history and philosophy of religion" *(Religion 101-102),* and the lectures are given by a group of specialists. Professor Friess has been in charge of the course, and with the help of Dr. Marguerite Block, has insured its continuity. The materials of the Bush Collection have been extensively used.

The value of this course, which is frequently remarked by students, rests surely in the first instance upon the significance and richness of the materials, but also upon the fact that the specialists who give the lec-

tures seem to enjoy it so thoroughly. In order to make an efficient use of time, this course does not deal directly with Biblical or Church History, which fields are so intensively studied in many other available courses. The general program of this course, during the past ten years, and the experts most frequently giving the lectures in their respective fields, have been, as follows:

Religion 101 (Figures represent usual lecture hours)

3 Introduction to historical study of religions
Horace Friess; Herbert Schneider
6 Themes and functions of religion in primitive societies
Ruth Benedict; Ralph Linton; Gladys Reichard
7 Religion in ancient Mesopotamia and Syria (Ugarit)
Isaac Mendelsohn
3 Zoroastrianism
K. D. Irani
3 Ancient Egyptian religion
By special invitation
6 Ancient Greek religion
Kurt Von Fritz
6 Hellenistic and Roman religions
Frederick C. Grant
6 Selected aspects of Christianity
Clarence Manning (Eastern); Herbert Schneider (Western)

Religion 102

2 Introductory
Horace Friess; Marguerite Block
6 Judaism (post-biblical)
Salo W. Baron; Joseph L. Blau
7 Islam
Arthur Jeffery
10 Hinduism and Indian Buddhism
George W. Briggs
7 Native Chinese religions
Homer H. Dubs; Chung-yuan Chang
3 Buddhism in China
By special invitation
5 Buddhism in Japan; and Shinto
Ryusaku Tsunoda

It has also been possible to invite many interesting visitors to give occasional lectures within the above framework of this course. Thus, over

the years, in *Religion 101* we have heard Alfred Kroeber and David C. Graham on particular primitive religions; Bernhard Geiger, Walter B. Henning, and J. Duchesne-Guillemin on Zoroastrianism; Ludlow Bull and Henri Frankfort on ancient Egypt; Alexander Krappe on early Mediterranean divinities and cults; André M. J. Festugière on religious thought in the Hellenistic age; Philip De Vargas on the introduction of Christianity in China; Georges Florovsky and Alexander Fedotov on phases of Byzantine and Russian Christianity; Heinrich Frick on post-war Protestantism in Europe. In *Religion 102* we have, in the same way, had special occasion to hear E. E. Elder, Kermit Schoonover, Louis Massignon, and S. R. Shafaq on aspects of Islam; G. P. Malalasekera on Buddhist, S. C. Roy and Swami Nikhilananda on Indian philosophies; Yu-lan Fung, Wing-tsit Chan, Chung-yuan Chang, Shih-chuan Chen, Karl Wittfogel, and Mme. Nicole Nicolas-Vandier on native Chinese religion and thought; J. J. L. Duyvendak, A. K. Reischauer, and Daisetz T. Suzuki on aspects of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. It has been fine fare.

THE COLLOQUIES CALLED "UNIVERSITY SEMINARS"

Contemporary culture, with its extreme specialization, has developed a deep dependence upon corporate research, and a conspicuous need for meaningful association and conference between intellectuals. The individual is no longer competent as a scientific authority. One manifestation of this condition, as it relates to contemporary thinking about religion, is the "Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life," begun in 1940. Dr. Louis Finkelstein, President of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, has headed the Conference, and Professors Lyman Bryson and Robert M. MacIver of Columbia University have been among its Directors. The symposia which have been published, through Harper & Brothers, of the meetings of this Conference present a striking view of contemporary efforts to bring ideas and data from many disciplines to bear upon issues and problems of common human concern.

As occasional affairs, conferences involving many disciplines have become familiar enough, but to make interdisciplinary study continuous and efficient remains a matter for constant experimentation. An interesting development has occurred at Columbia since World War II. In

1945 it was proposed by Professor Frank Tannenbaum, of the Department of History, that "University Seminars" be organized in the Graduate Faculties for "co-operative study of basic human institutions or problems of enduring interest and importance." The idea caught on; so that by now some sixteen of these advanced colloquies, bringing together scholars from many fields and also some professional people from the non-academic community, have been set up. Whatever the intellectual productivity and other consequences of these groups may prove to be, it is clear that they have been welcome increments of scholarly community on this campus.

In the graduate study of religion the Faculty at Columbia were already thoroughly committed and accustomed to an interdepartmental program. For the professors in this program the "University Seminars" offered one more attractively flexible and informal way to explore some timely frontier problems together. The "University Seminar on Religion" *(University Seminar 405-406),* organized in 1945, has since then carried on a threefold colloquy. One group, meeting from 1946 through 1948, under the chairmanship of Professor Salo W. Baron, examined the relations of "Religion and Democracy." Papers and reports from the discussions of this group were published in the January 1948 number of *The Review of Religion* (Vol. XII, No. 2). A group meeting since 1952, with Dr. Moses Jung and Dr. Marguerite Block as co-chairmen, is occupied with "Inter-Religious Relations." Since the Seminar has been in an exploratory stage, its deliberations have not yet been reported.

Another branch of the University Seminar on Religion was active from 1945 through 1950, and it is hoped that future circumstances will permit its revival. This group, under chairmanships of Horace Friess, Otis Rice, and David Roberts, explored relations of "Religion and Health," with much emphasis on mental health problems. Papers from this group have been published twice in *The Review of Religion* in May 1946 (Vol. X, No. 4) and in March 1949 (Vol. XIII, No. 3). There is also a more comprehensive report, in multigraph form, of these discussions, by Horace L. Friess, under the title: "The University Seminar on Religion and Health. A report and evaluation of its first years, 1945-1950." Among its accomplishments this group furnished a many-angled guidance to several doctoral candidates, whose research involved interrelations of religion and psychotherapy. One such study, published in

book form, is that of Robert H. Bonthius, *Christian Paths to Self-Acceptance* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1948).

From time to time it has been suggested that the University's program for doctoral studies in the field of religion should include another division, devoted to "Religion and Psychology," especially in view of the great bearing of psychotherapeutic enlightenment on religious theory and practice. Partly because it would be a complex and expensive undertaking, but also for another reason, the suggestion has not met with favor thus far. The view has prevailed that the training most needed and desired in this case is more properly a part of vocational preparation than a matter for inquiry of the kind that Ph.D. research should imply. The argument has real force, although it should not mean that academic research and vocational training shall not know each other!

Yet it is historical fact that the place where developmental and educational psychology have hitherto been brought into relation most with the study of religion at Columbia has been in some semi-vocational programs of study leading to a Master of Arts degree.

THE M.A. PROGRAMS

Through the Faculties of Teachers College and of Union Theological Seminary, Columbia University has for many years been conferring several Master of Arts degrees in fields of religion. At Teachers College the M.A. degree could be taken with specialization in Religious Education, while Union Seminary has offered programs leading to this degree in (1) "the literature and religion of the Bible," (2) "the comparative study of Christianity and other religions," and (3) "Christian education." It appears that all these programs relate closely to vocational preparation for teaching in various contexts, whether in church schools, mission fields, or in general education. But it is not to be inferred that the content of these several programs was limited to the teaching of techniques, or is so today. A good deal of liberal historical scholarship, of alert study of social relations, and a growing knowledge of developmental psychology has supplied the substance of these studies. A further clue to their character and emphasis may be given by mentioning some of the professors most active in directing them during recent decades,—such teachers as Adelaide T. Case, F. Ernest Johnson, Goodwin Watson, Harrison Elliott, Frank W. Herriott, and Arthur L. Swift, Jr.

The contributions of these colleagues, and still others working with them, to the study of religion is a matter of sufficient interest and scope to require separate, detailed treatment, too extensive to be included here. Another hand should undertake to write this story, because, unlike the rest of this account, the essential facts are not an intimate part of the present writer's personal experience.

A change in the climate of ideas, still much unsettled, has been taking place for several decades in our culture. It involves the reappraisal of religious traditions, which some call "neo-orthodoxy." Somewhat apart from professional clerical or teaching objectives, a desire was awakened in colleges and graduate schools for a fuller study of religious institutions and ideas as a part of the human heritage. One outcome of this desire at Columbia was the setting-up, in 1950, of a new M.A. program in the field of religion. This program aimed to give more historical, theological, and philosophical content than the several semi-vocational programs described just above. It permits major emphasis in any one of the following fields: "biblical studies; history of religious ideas and institutions; systematic theology; religious ethics; history of religions; and philosophy of religion." The program is administered by a new interdepartmental committee of Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary, separate from but, in some respects, parallel in operations to the joint committee of those institutions which, since 1943, has been conducting doctoral studies in the field of religion. Professor John Dillenberger became Executive Secretary of the new committee, and his course on the "History of religious thought in the Christian west" has been an important one in the program. The Department of Philosophy (which until 1950 supervised students taking an M.A. in "Philosophy of Religion") retains its interest by representation on the joint committee.

According to Professor Dillenberger, among the students electing this new M.A. program less than one tenth have well-marked professional or vocational interests in taking it. Their prevailing motivations are cultural and religious, or to gain more satisfactory personal orientation. The world situation has contributed both to the urgency of this motive, and to the variety of this student group, which includes a significant number of émigrés from different lands. The yeasting of our times is felt here.

The new M.A. program was introduced during the Chaplaincy at Co-

lumbia of Dr. James A. Pike. His convictions regarding it helped to precipitate its development, as well as to raise several issues relating to college programs for the study of religion, which remain to be discussed.

CHARACTER OF COLLEGE PROGRAMS

A big university can flourish in fostering as many meaningful lines of inquiry as possible, and must take pride in the variety of its scholarly life. A college must have a greater measure of integration, which presses the question of selective and organizing principles in its curriculum.

From the foregoing pages, describing thirty years of growth in the study of religion at Columbia, it must be evident that certain scholars on this campus have been greatly interested in extending and improving the historical study of religion in the general life of mankind. We have felt that this was not just a scholar's pastime, but a wonderfully fertile educational field, as the subject can now be pursued and at this juncture in the meeting of the world's peoples, for the development of the mind, the imagination, and the spirit. We have had to admit that many valuable materials of the field are only gradually being made available to contemporary readers who are not specialists. As one more project in this direction, the American Council of Learned Societies, through its Committee on the History of Religions, is sponsoring a series of readers to "give students a direct acquaintance with the religious heritages and faiths of various peoples." These "readers" are intended for inquiring laymen rather than for advanced students. Professors Herbert Schneider and Horace Friess have been chairmen of the Board editing this series, which is being published by The Liberal Arts Press, as "The Library of Religion," with the aid of an initial grant from The Hazen Foundation. By now, three volumes have appeared: *Buddhism. A Religion of Infinite Compassion* (edited by Clarence H. Hamilton); *Hellenistic Religions. The Age of Syncretism* (edited by Frederick C. Grant); *Judaism. Postbiblical and Talmudic Period* (edited by Salo W. Baron and Joseph L. Blau). Other volumes on *The Religions of the Ancient Near East; Hinduism since the Bhagavadgita; Ancient Roman Religion; Islam; Eastern Orthodox Christianity;* and *Ancient Greek Religions* are in preparation.

But does such fare as these titles suggest give a feasible answer to the question facing us? Can this wide historical heritage of man's religions

give the key for a suitably integrated college program in the study of religion? Or is it too far flung and exotic, even for today's expanding universe? For some time past a quite different answer has indeed been proposed. During the 'thirties a group at Princeton (including Professors Theodore Greene and George Thomas) put forward the propositions that (1) a religion could only be authentically understood and interpreted from inside, that is by those who experience it as adherents; and (2) that the traditions of Judeo-Christian religion being historically central to our culture, their authentic interpretation should be central to the study of religion in our colleges. These two principles have had great influence since their enunciation; and whatever they leave out, they clearly have weight.

Dr. James A. Pike espoused similar principles vigorously, when in 1949 he became Chaplain at Columbia and Executive Officer of the Department of Religion. In accordance with them, he introduced a large number of new courses, to be taught by scholars within the main traditions of Judeo-Christian religion—courses in Judaism, by Rabbi Robert Gordis, in Eastern Orthodoxy, by Father Georges Florovsky, in Roman Catholic doctrines, by Msgr. William O'Connor, in Protestantism, by Paul Tillich and others. It is a point of further interest that Dr. Pike offered the hospitality of the Columbia Chapel for services in distinct liturgical traditions also.

It was not Dr. Pike's intention to have only courses of the type just described. "It is important," he announced, "that the major strains in our pluralistic culture be presented by both those who stand within and those who stand outside." In 1951 he included over thirty courses in an Announcement of the "Courses in Religion." The University was now indeed giving all these courses (and more besides) for the study of religion, but the building of a well-structured college program was not thereby accomplished. In fact, many questions were raised. Would this kind of development lead to the fragmenting of study in religion for various enclaves of students along denominational lines? Would teaching tend toward scholastic analysis of inherited bodies of doctrine, rather than to exploring the living significance of the entire field? Would there be open inquiry, as well as apologetic, with an encouragement of realism and integrity in examining divergent values and viewpoints? Would there be a fruitful creative relation between theological interpretation

and the contributions of other disciplines, historical and philosophical, psychological and social? Some of these questions, and still others, were sensitively considered in an article by Professor John Dillenberger on "Teaching Religion: Problems and Requirements," which was published in March 1954 in the *Union Theological Seminary Quarterly Review* (Vol. 9, No. 3).

Whatever may be said for orthodoxy in religion, there is no doctrine which once and for all can insure the proper academic balance in a constructive program for the study of religion. Changing circumstance and the nature of free inquiry preclude this. The demands of the *xairos,* and the promise contained in new methods and ideas must keep the problem perennially open.

Furthermore, a satisfactory program for college study of religion must be in accord with the instructional pattern and spirit of the particular college. Columbia College (with its Contemporary Civilization, its Humanities courses and Colloquia) can not readily take the same kind of program that obtains in Barnard College where, in the 'forties with Professor Ursula M. Niebuhr in charge, a sequence was worked out that included: Bible, religious ideas in western thought, religious and ethical issues in contemporary life, philosophy of religion, Oriental religions, and elective individual reading. In Columbia's School of General Studies a still different range and balance of elections may prove suitable.

The question which the theologians seem to be raising today is not primarily the question of virtue. Almost no one claims to know, any more than Socrates did, how men can be made good. The question they are raising is rather that of a framework for the meaningful interpretation of life. And this is, indeed, quite a question, as one walks up and down in the world observing men and their works. Not without depth of experience, nor without productive imagination, can a sufficient framework of interpretation be found. It is bound to have continuity with many elements of traditional wisdom; it can not be a new concoction of yesterday. But authentic interpretation of our world also requires large reconstructive and inventive scope. The stability and the creative power we need must arise both from familiar truth and from fresh growth.

COMMUNICATION

Eighth International Congress for the History of Religions

This important Congress will be held in Rome, from the seventeenth to the twenty-third of April inclusive, 1955. It will be the eighth in a series: Paris, 1900; Basel, 1904; Oxford, 1908; Leiden, 1912; Lund, 1927; Brussels, 1935; and Amsterdam, 1950. It was at the Amsterdam Congress in 1950 that the International Association for the Study of the History of Religions was founded, for the purpose of uniting various already existing national and non-national groups, and individuals as well, under a central administrative committee. Among the groups now affiliated with I.A.S.H.R. are the following:

The International Organization of Old Testament Scholars
"Théonoé," Société d'Études Mythologiques (Belgium)
Société E. Renan (France)
Deutscher Zweig der Internationalen Vereinung für das Studium der Religionsgeschichte (Germany)
Genootschap van Godsdiensthistorici (Holland)
Societa di Storia delle Religioni (Italy)
The Japanese Association for Science of Religion (Japan)
Norsk religionshistorisk forening (Norway)
Svenska religionshistoriska samfundet (Sweden)
Committee on History of Religions of the American Council of Learned Societies (United States)

Since January, 1951, I.A.S.H.R. has been affiliated with UNESCO, as a member of its "International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies," with a representative on its Standing Committee.

Since the sudden death of Professor Gerardus van der Leeuw, the Association's eminent first president, Raffaele Pettazzoni, Professor of the History of Religion at the University of Rome, has held office, with the assistance of two vice-presidents, Geo Widengren, of Uppsala, and H. Ch. Puech, of Paris, and a general secretary, C. J. Bleeker, of Amsterdam. Other members of the Executive Board are: W. A. Rijk, of Amsterdam; A. Alföldi, of Basel; F. Heiler, of Marburg; E. O. James, of London; and A. D. Nock, of Cambridge, Mass.

The Congress at Rome, like its predecessors, will be scientific, international, and non-confessional in character. The central theme to be

explored is "The king-god and the sacral character of kingship," which will be treated both in its historical and phenomenological aspects. English, French, German, and Italian will be the official languages of the Congress. For further information, apply to The Secretariat of the Congress, Via Michelangelo Caetani 32 (Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici), Roma.

One of the most important projects of the new International Association is the publication of an organ entitled, *Numen: International Review for the History of Religions,* under the editorship of Professor Pettazzoni, whose long experience as editor of *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni* makes him an especially happy choice. The new journal made its debut in January, 1954 (Vol. I, Fasc. 1). Its character and quality may best be revealed by its table of contents:

G. Widengren: Raffaele Pettazzoni septuagenaire
R. Pettazzoni: Apercu introductif
G. van der Leeuw†: Confession scientifique faite à l'Université Masaryk de Brno
G. Widengren: Stand und Aufgaben der iranischen Religionsgeschichte, I
A. D. Nock: Odo Casel
C. J. Bleeker: The I.A.S.H.R.

Numen will be published in three issues a year, at the price of $5.30 annually, by E. J. Brill, Leiden. All contributions should be addressed to the Editor, Professor Raffaele Pettazzoni, Via Crescenzio 63, Roma.

La Religione nella Grecia antica. By RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI. (edizioni scientifiche Einaudi, Collezione di studi religiosi, etnologici e psicologici, 21). Turin G. Einaudi, 1953. 282 pp. L. 1,000.

The first edition of this work by the well known professor of the history of religion in the University of Rome was published in 1921. Since then a number of very original, penetrating, and comprehensive works on Greek religion have been published: Walter F. Otto, *Die Götter Griechenlands;* U. von Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen;* Otto Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen;* A. J. Festugière, *La religion grecque,* and, above all, M. P. Nilsson's monumental work, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion,* to mention only a few of the most important ones; and an enormous number of books and articles both on Greek religion in general and on special problems. Yet, if one compares the present second edition with the original, one finds that very little has been added to the text, though the notes not infrequently contain references to and discussions of more recent contributions to the field. To each chapter, furthermore, there has been added a bibliography which is carried down to the year 1952.

This does not mean that the author has not learned or has not found anything to be learned from the literature of the last three decades. His main text has been greatly shortened rather than enlarged as compared with the first edition. While not inconsiderable portions of the work have been retained unaltered both in content and in wording, the author has eliminated a good many sections that contained theories or formulations of theories that would not stand up under the most careful scrutiny, and he has re-formulated others. In this way the work has gained greatly in clarity and precision; and the author is all the more to be congratulated on his procedure, since most scholars and writers tend to enlarge their works in a second edition rather than to eliminate what has not stood the test of time.

That the author did not make a greater positive use of the literature published since his first edition is obviously due to the fact that he has a special approach to his subject, and one may readily agree that to have paid greater attention to the opinions of others would have impaired

the unity of his work. He does not intend to give anything like a complete account of the history of Greek religion from the beginnings to Alexander in all its various aspects, which certainly could not have been done in a book of comparatively small size. He rather tries to show the interrelation between the development of Greek religion and the history of Greek civilization in general, especially in its ethnological, economic, social, and political aspects. One therefore must not look in his work for a systematic account of what is called Greek mythology, of the various gods and their cults, of the ritual, of religious festivals, etc. All these matters are touched upon only by means of examples fit to illustrate what is the main concern of the author.

In his first chapter, which deals with the origins of Greek religion, the author first points out that what we can learn about Greek religion from ancient literature must be supplemented by what can be learned from linguistic analysis, from archeology, and from anthropology, i.e., from a comparative study of the religious beliefs and practices of primitive people. Linguistic analysis and archeological evidence show that in Greece two nations of different racial origin, of different language, and of different religious beliefs have grown together to form what later became the Greek nation, and that this double origin of Greek civilization is, of course, also apparent in Greek religion. Anthropology has taught us to distinguish various different but typical forms of religion, like magic, totemism, animism, fetishism, and what the author calls naturalism, i.e., a belief in personalized natural powers, phenomena, and forces. Of these various types of religion he considers animism and naturalism as dominant among the Greeks of historical times, but warns against the oversimplified theory that naturalism was the religion of the Indo-European immigrants, animism in the form of a cult of the dead that of the pre-Indo-European population, and that Greek religion is simply a mixture of these two elements. He tries to show that the truth is somewhat more complicated, though he finds evidence that actually, in pre-Homeric times, the cult of the dead was predominant and that the cult of the Olympic gods—who, in his opinion, were essentially nature gods—became predominant only later. He rightly believes that the development of epic poetry greatly contributed to the later prevalence of the belief in the Olympic gods, because it elaborated the myth and

so created the notion of a society of gods with definite relations to one another, the essence of true polytheism.

In the following three chapters with the titles "La 'Polis,'" "Le Plebi," and "Prevalenza della religione olimpica," the author discusses the development of Greek religion that was concomitant with the rise of the city state. Especially in its earlier stages, this development is characterized by the cleavage between two social classes, the aristocracy and the "people." To the peasants and craftsmen, gods like Demeter, Dionysos, and Hephaistos meant more than aristocratic gods like Zeus or Apollo. But, the author points out, while politically the lower classes prevailed in the end and democracy was established, the artistocratic Olympic religion first absorbed the agrarian religion of the lower classes and then became the dominant civic religion of the democratic polis, which, in religious matters, became very conservative.

The fifth chapter deals with Orphism. The author does not concern himself with any detailed criticism of the tradition concerning this mysterious movement, as I. M. Linforth has done so thoroughly in his *Arts of Orpheus*. He considers Orphism as a sectarian movement that in no way associated with the state and carefully avoided all political associations. This in his opinion was the reason why it could not survive for long. But it had an important function, nevertheless, in the development of Greek religion, since it presented an "attenuated" anthropomorphism and so prepared the way for religious thought in concepts rather than in mythological images. Yet Greek philosophy proper, as the author tries to show in the sixth chapter, did not start from Orphic speculation. It did not originate in the Greek motherland but in the colonies, especially on the coast of Asia Minor, where the Greeks were scattered and found themselves surrounded by a great number of different and often superior civilizations. In such an environment the native traditions of the Greeks were bound to break down. So the Greek colonists had to work out their own new and original explanations of the world, and the result was the philosophical speculation of the Pre-Socratics.

In the seventh and eighth chapters, "Atene e le guerre persiane" and "Atene al tempo di Pericle," the author enlarges what he has said in the preceding chapters and applies it specifically to the development that

took place in Athens in the course of the fifth century. A large part of the eighth chapter describes the criticism of traditional religion introduced in Athens by Anaxagoras and further developed by some of the so-called Sophists, and also the popular reaction to this criticism. The ninth chapter, "Crisi e superamento," carries the story further through the Peloponnesian War to the death of Socrates. This is the period of the rise of individualism, which was promoted above all by the teaching of the Sophists. The conflict between this individualism and the traditional authority of the state appears to the author in a way overcome and resolved by Socrates, who was an individualist himself but an individualist so firmly convinced of the obligation of the individual to the state that he refused to make use of the opportunity to escape when condemned to death unjustly but by a legally constituted law court.

The tenth and last chapter, "La fine dell' antico ellenismo," concerns itself with various leading personalities and general trends of the fourth century: with Antisthenes, who, the author contends, created a new philosophy of action, in profound contrast to the philosophy of his revered teacher Socrates; with the spreading of all sorts of mystery religions, most of them of Thracian or Oriental origin; with Plato, Xenophon, and Isocrates; with the panhellenic movement; and finally with Alexander the Great and the new trend towards the deification of human beings. "The religion of the city state," so the author concludes, "which had been a religion paying reverence to the gods gave way to a religion of the empire state which was a religion of paying reverence to the sovereign as the god-man. And for the religion of nature was substituted, as religious form of the new political order, the religion of (super-) man."

A work of such scope compressed within 282 pages can hardly avoid oversimplifications. But the author makes a great many most interesting points. He is especially to be praised for the excellent use he makes of the vase paintings to illustrate the changing religious trends of the different epochs. In the new edition a great many excellent photographs have been added, which very much increase the value of the book.

KURT VON FRITZ

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The Religion of the Hindus. Edited by KENNETH W. MORGAN. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953. xii, 434 pp. $5.00.

Even more remarkable than for the information which it contains, this book, a co-operative product of internationally known Indian scholars, is notable on another account. The student of religion who has no specialized knowledge of the religion of the Hindus should and will receive this volume as a welcome and compact statement of fundamentals, together with typical selections from Hindu scriptures. To others more familiar with the philosophies and religions of India, it will be somewhat less epoch-making than it has been hailed in the Christian press, for nearly every one of the contributors has published work more detailed and comprehensive elsewhere, but also less accessible.

However, here, for the first time, we get statements by eminent Hindu scholars who are frank and not inclined to compromise with Western views, nor to think of Hindu worship unduly mindful of Western criticism. Quaker Chaplain Morgan, the editor, The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, and the Fellows of The National Council on Religion in Higher Education wanted a book describing, within the covers of one volume, the essential features of the Hindu religion. They received such a book, and it is to their credit to have printed the material much as they received it from the contributors, except for some condensation, rearrangement, and the elimination of some Sanskrit terminology, but without, I take it, major alterations.

The reader will get the underdrift of national pride in nearly every one of the articles. The authors are fully conscious of the high spiritual plane on which the religion of the Hindus moves, even though they acknowledge elements of a lower order which they attribute, without condemnation, to lack of intelligence on the part of the worshiper. For, in the Hindu view all forms of worship redound to the credit of the worshiper and, by fostering forgetfulness of self, bring him closer to the divine. It is this element of total tolerance which is underlined by most of the authors. They glory in the fact that all religious practices and images have lofty metaphysical support. Since all manifestations are divine, none is to be rejected, none to be apologized for. No excuses are made for the general belief in astrology, none for image worship, none for caste, in so far as it persists and has still some function in Hindu society until its time shall have run out. At long last, these scholars step

up to the rostrum to lay the case of the religion of Brahmanism before the world, regardless of past vilifications. Yes, some Hindus have criticized the fact that no "theologian," no *sadhu,* has been asked to contribute to the volume. Their criticism would be valid if, among such, an equally objective mind could have been found who, with clarity and detachment, could have ranged over these subjects without being committed to a particular creed. The professors of Sanskrit, the historians, the educators, and the philosophers have done a good job within the limits allotted to them. A reader familiar with the Indian scene will detect here and there little regional prejudices or biases, as when the case for Bengal, or for the South of India, is put forth more vigorously; but this is not a weighty matter.

Whoever knows the tremendous complexity of the "religion" of the Hindus may be inclined to regard the present volume as an oversimplification. There is justification for this view, but all introductions share this fault. Hinduism in this book is given the strict interpretation of "within the tradition of the Vedas." We submit that much could be said of a controversial nature on this point.

In his inimitable style, D. S. Sarma has given us a charming and inspired account of the nature and history of Hinduism. The theology of Hinduism was penned in broad outlines by Satis Chandra Chatterjee in somewhat novel fashion, with divisions of the doctrinal material altogether more natural and illuminating than those previously presented. The religious practices of the Hindus have been written up by Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya, who has systematically packed within the scope of a single chapter multitudinous religious habits of a highly individualistic religion.

The concept of God was the difficult assignment of Jitendra Nath Banerjea. The very prejudice of the Western mind against the formidable array of gods and goddesses of the Hindu pantheon had to be softened. The treatment is not metaphysical; it is based on art, archeology, and linguistics, as well as history. The author is, perhaps more than the other writers, influenced by Western intellectualism.

Radhagovinda Basak deals philosophically with the interesting subject of nature as she appears in the Hindu consciousness, which regards all life as sacred and the universe as divine in origin and substance.

Hence, from star to the merest pebble, all things are the occasions for a Hindu to be reminded of God and therefore demand worship.

With his usual elegance and scholarship R. N. Dandekar tackles the role of man in Hinduism, how he stands in relation to God on the one hand, and to his fellowmen, on the other. A Hindu's every act is, ideally, fraught with religious significance, not of a purely formal kind only, but permeated by a sense of the presence of God.

The symposium of the six Hindu scholars is not all that Professor Morgan presents us. The second, and a good part, consists of selections from Hindu sacred writings with an introduction, all done with skill and mastery in limitation, by V. Raghavan. The selections from the *Bhagavad Gītā,* however, represent translations by D. S. Sarma.

The bibliography could have been fuller and more diversified; the guide to pronunciation leaves much to be desired; the definitions in the glossary correspond largely to or repeat those found in the text; the index is useful. The book, it must be remembered, is not descriptive, merely. It is alive and functional in the articles contributed by the Indian scholars. It can be used to good advantage by all who wish to get acquainted with the deeply spiritual nature of all adherents of Hinduism, a fact often overshadowed by the events on the economic and political horizon. Could we ask the question whether religion, lodged so firmly and ubiquitously in the heart of every Hindu, can ever be unseated by a belief in an unfeeling nature, a soulless man, a universe devoid of God? The effort would have to be superhuman—or demoniac.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

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The Ḍoms and Their Near Relations. By GEORGE WESTON BRIGGS. Mysore, India: The Wesley Press, 1953. ix, 680 pp. 16 plates.

This is the story of "untouchability," an "evil" existent in India throughout thirty centuries at least, which, according to the Indian ambassador to the United States, has not yet been rooted out (New Haven *Journal-Courier,* June 1, 1954, reporting his address on May 31st at Fisk University). He declares, however, that "the government and the majority of the people" are determined to abolish it.

There are today some thirteen millions of "untouchables," members of "tribes despised for their filthy habits, their ugly features and their unsettled, nomadic life" who, according to the "Aryan" tradition, "do not perform sacrifices nor believe anything" (p. 3). They represent the dregs of society from even pre-historic times, "non-Aryan both physically and in their basic cultural characteristics," in spite of "constant contacts with other racial elements" (p. 605).

Is their status their own doing, or is it for want of privileges denied them? In any case, it is a peculiar form of segregation! Professor Briggs has told the story thoroughly, showing how these people have been "pursued relentlessly by society through this interminable age" (p. 605), and how difficult is a solution "because of their extreme degradation and their irresponsible situation" (p. 614). It is an impressive story of what Hinduism has tolerated and enforced, in spite of reforms which some Hindus have undertaken from time to time (pp. 607 f.).

This is a monumental and exhaustive work worthy of appreciative commendation. It is encyclopedic with its infinite details, the fruit of personal observation and of patient and persistent search among "materials hidden in generally inaccessible journals, old books, gazetteers and reports" (p. vii). The title of the volume may be qualified to this extent, namely, that two classes of Ḍoms, the Caṇḍālas and the Śvapākas, are made to furnish most of the materials. Says he, "the names Caṇḍāla and Śvapāka appear in all periods of Indian history and in all classes of the literature," Brahman, Jain, and Buddhist (p. 38). It is, of course, not a *popular* story, although well written; it is, rather, an accumulation of valuable details which must now be stored in every useful library and within handy reach of students of sociology and primitive religion. Multitudes will be in grateful debt to him—and the Wesley Press—throughout the coming years. He is an authority worthy of full trust. His is not a hasty, superficial work. Nor will its apparent but unavoidable repetitions now and then annoy the earnest reader. There is much of the uniform in the primitive.

While items from the whole of India, both historical and geographical, have taken Briggs' attention, he presents extraordinary data from the region of Benares and the Gangetic plain, where Caṇḍālas and Śvapākas and many other tribes are numerous. The Ḍoms and their obvious relatives have been increasing steadily in numbers since the be-

ginning of the present century (p. 119), and although they number only some thirteen millions, they are virtually to be numbered among the fifty millions who compose the "exterior" castes.

Briggs depicts "the struggle for existence" which the Ḍoms have undergone (Chs. VII), accounting for their various activities, not the least of which is crime. Others have been menial service of all sorts: the gathering of fuel (including what has been used for the burning of the dead), disposing of dead animals, begging, service as village watchmen, masons and carpenters, trappers, fishermen, rope-dancing, midwifery, prostitution, cattle-lifting, sheep-stealing, counterfeiting, house-breaking—indeed an interminable list of lowly and criminal occupations, any full account of which is in its own way a lamentable commentary upon age-old Hinduism. What a problem, then, is any just and effectual reformation!

There are chapters also in the volume which offer in vivid detail some account of birth, marriage, and other domestic customs (VIII-XII). And chapters XIII-XIX (pp. 373-604) present more especially the religious elements of Ḍom existence, whether folk-magic and spirits, nature-objects venerated, gods great and small, or priests and the peoples' worship. What a treasure-house this one volume is! But not the least important chapter is the last, which offers some discussion of "The Future." The average reader will find it, perhaps, the most engaging. The author has already presented the picture "of one people living much the same life through the milleniums" (p. 605). Against the background of this uniformity he offers glimpses of attempted reformations (especially from 1870 on), and has occasion, of course, to refer to Muslim administration in its time and to Christian occupation. Under both Muslims and Christians "there has been some liberalizing of attitudes towards untouchables" (p. 613), and the fundamental fact of their being criminals so largely has been taken into some account (p. 616), with communities sometimes established in which better ways might be taught (cf. p. 620). Briggs remarks that "progress is slow and there is not only the inertia within the castes themselves to be overcome, but also the scarcely relaxed opposition of the orthodox to any change." He even shows incidentally something which the West has not well understood, namely, that Gandhi, "while he would have these outcaste peoples treated decently and justly, he still believes (Briggs was writing be-

fore the Mahatma's death) in their social position as in the nature of things" (p. 610). For Gandhi the principles of *karma* (action and its fruits) and *varna* (color) operated with certain values. They had merely been degraded and had fallen into disrepute. He held that "rights follow from the performance of duties" and said as much (p. 611).

Briggs records some stirring of "Hindu thought concerning signs of unrest" in India, and mentions newer movements toward reform, with due emphasis upon "the function of education" (p. 646). Says he, "The solution of the Dom's social-economic problem must involve leaving him *in* society and working towards a change of mind and outlook, what used to be called 'conversion' " (p. 649). But he concedes that "the Dom is a 'Gypsy,' a restless, roving individual and group, and it will take time to get him attached to land . . ., so as to feel its worth and the responsibility which its possession will create," and cites the Methodist work in Benares as an example of the change which "must be the fruit of patient, protracted and devoted service" (p. 649).

Hats off to Briggs for the final publication of this monumental, invaluable, and stimulating work. The reviewer writes with feeling, because he himself knew some of the Doms at first hand (a village of settled Beriyas near Jabalpur), and he knows Briggs well.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

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Vivekananda: the Yogas and Other Works. Selected and edited, with biographical introduction, by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1953; xii, 978 pp. $10.00.

Those whose interest in religion is purely academic, and who wish it to remain so, are advised to eschew this book. The impact of the Indian monk's personality is tremendous. Through addresses, poems, and letters—and indirectly through the introductory biography—through a thousand pages the Swami besieges us with incessant blows; we feel ourselves at the mercy of a religious genius of a very high order, and of a human being whose vitality, learning, eloquence, and scope are all—to state it baldly—enormous.

Most of these pages were composed when Vivekananda was at the

height of his powers, during his first sojourn in the West. They are familiar to students of Indian religion and religious psychology through earlier and less polished publication in this country and in India. What emerges as most impressive in a re-reading of them is the unity of purpose, in keeping with the non-dualistic position that the author maintains in the tradition of Śankara's commentaries upon the Vedas and of the teaching of Śri Ramakrishna, his own immediate master. In the insistence on synthesis: of East and West, of the traditions of Hindu and Muslim, of the concepts of Impersonal and Personal God, of the four Yogas (Jnāna, Bhakti, Karma, and Rāja) with which the book is primarily concerned, or of the multiple faiths of mankind, the central theme is always—unity.

The persistence of this theme does not become oppressive, largely because of the author's liveliness, charm, and comic spirit. These qualities are re-inforced by personal letters and biographical anecdotes. For example: a Harvard professor belonged to a group of the Swami's disciples.

> At the end of every discourse the tense professor would invariably ask the teacher: "Well, Swami, it all amounts to this in the end, doesn't it?—I *am* Brahman, I *am* the Absolute." The Swami would smile indulgently and answer gently, "Yes, Dockie, you are Brahman, you are the Absolute, in the real essence of your being." Later, when the learned doctor came to the table a trifle late, the Swami, with the utmost gravity but with a merry twinkle in his eyes, would say, "'Here comes Brahman" or "Here is the Absolute."

But the chief ornament of Vivekananda's teaching is his use of the illustrative parable. This is in the great tradition of the Oriental religious teacher, as witness Jesus and Ramakrishna; though Vivekananda relies heavily on examples drawn from the literary classics of his culture rather than on contemporary realistic narratives, perhaps because of his own more learned background.

The present volume was published appropriately on the sixtieth anniversary of Vivekananda's appearance at the Chicago Parliament of Religions, 1893. It includes, with his best recorded utterances, the biographical and interpretative material helpful to an understanding of them. A previous reader of Vivekananda who believes he has detected occasional echoes of Wordsworth and Shelley, for example, is gratified to find evidence of their immediate influence. For the student there are

an accompanying glossary and an index, both of which really work. Most welcome of all is the re-editing of earlier texts. The Swami's expression was spontaneous, and the means by which it was recorded and preserved not always such as to satisfy present-day standards. Swami Nikhilananda has taken the liberty of revising the text so as to clarify his predecessor's essential meaning—a liberty sanctioned by the fact that the editor was nurtured in the religious, philosophical, and monastic tradition of the original. His editorial work has salvaged passages decorated with many penciled question marks in the margins of earlier editions. Compare, for example, a sentence on page 120 of *Jnana-Yoga* (New York, 1949): "But he who knows the secret of nature, seeing That which is beyond nature through the help of nature, he crosses death, and through the help of That which is beyond nature, he enjoys Eternal Bliss" with the revision made by the present volume: "But he who knows the secret of nature, and also That which is beyond nature—through the help of nature he crosses death, and through the help of That which is beyond nature he enjoys Eternal Bliss." Or note how the rephrasing and reparagraphing of pages 298-299 of the new edition bring out the meaning of the earlier version.

The present volume of Vivekananda appears at a time when Americans are concerned with gaining an understanding of the Indian mind and hence of the culture that has helped to shape it. In spite of occasional touches of naiveté and quaintness, particularly in his references to science, Vivekananda as an Indian believer is perhaps preferable to any Western agnostic as a guide to the religion of the Hindus. This is a time also when our own young people are showing an awakened religious interest that may lead them to re-examine their own Christian tradition and perhaps to resume the ancient process of enriching it from Oriental sources. In such days it is refreshing to read a book which makes no bones about constantly talking of God on the assumption that He exists. Swami Vivekananda insisted on the desirability of the mutual association of religious-minded people. And he did not hesitate to commit himself utterly to the simple—and staggering—proposition that the quest for the realization of God is the only occupation really worthy of a human being.

NELSON S. BUSHNELL

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The Development of Chinese Zen after the Sixth Patriarch. By Heinrich Dumoulin, S. J. Translated by Ruth Fuller Sasaki. New York: The First Zen Institute of America, 1953. xxii, 104 pp. $4.50.

This is an English translation of a German work on Zen Buddhism by a Jesuit Father. As far as the original work is concerned, there is not much new material to enrich our knowledge of Zen beyond what is already known to European readers, except, perhaps, some parts of the chapter on "The Five Houses." What, however, distinguishes the translation and makes it useful, especially for those who have some preliminary knowledge of the Chinese language and literature is the "Appendices."

The translator is quite emphatic about the Japanese language being a most helpful medium in the study of Zen as Zen is at present studied in Japan. While Zen is a Chinese production or development out of Indian Buddhism and there are still many Zen monasteries in China, it seems to have ceased to be a living spiritual force, as it once was, in the land of its birth. Apparently, Japan is the only place on earth where Zen is still kept alive.

The translator is a zealous advocate of traditionalism and authoritarianism, especially as they have developed in the past two hundred and fifty years in Japan. Perhaps this conservative spirit made her take up the task of reproducing the German work "faithfully" and "literally," without trying to write an original work of her own. She is competent enough for this kind of undertaking, and the reviewer wonders why she did not feel like benefiting us by her own experience and scholarship.

Father Dumoulin's book was written principally "in the light of *Mumonkuan.*" Hence its scope is very much limited, and the title as it stands on the cover is misleading. In my opinion, the *Mumonkuan* is not such an important text in the study of Zen as is thought by some Zen followers, nor is the *Hekigan.* The works written during the T'ang dynasty are more stimulating for modern students.

Father Dumoulin is a learned scholar in the Eastern lore, no doubt, but cannot be expected to understand Zen, and it is natural that his statements frequently are not to the point. To illustrate, when referring to Joshu, he remarks (p. 12): "In many of his sayings unrelatedness and absurdity are pushed to the extreme." He then cites Joshu's famous

"seven-*kin* robe" in answer to a monk's question, "Where does the One go?" The question, in our "related" and "logical" language, may be regarded as equivalent to "Where does God finally go?" or "Where is he this very moment?" or "Where was he yesterday, and where will he be tomorrow?" Joshu's response, to my mind, is indeed far from being "unrelated and absurd," but most intimate and exactly to the point.

Father Dumoulin then concludes: "Inexhaustible in remarkable conceits, he [Joshu] continued to contrive new oddities until the great age of one hundred and twenty years." My English understanding in all probability is insufficient, but what does the Jesuit scholar mean by "conceit" and by "to contrive"? And why does Mrs. Sasaki, the translator, who has spent so many years mastering "Koan Zen" under so many masters, remain silent about this challenging remark? Where is Joshu's "conceit" and "contrivance"? As we all know, the translator is an "ultra-authoritarian," while the Jesuit Father is far from even being an "authoritarian."

Father Dumoulin's treatment of "The Five Ranks" is another unsatisfactory item. It is not very clear, nor is it in accord with the spirit of traditional interpretation. What we may call the theoretical aspect of "The Five Ranks" ends with the third, and with the fourth starts the practical application of it to our daily life, especially in its social relationships. The Rinzai school, ever since Hakuin, emphasizes this interpretation.

Instead of being so concerned with the different way of pronouncing certain Zen terms, the translator would have done better if she spent more time in clarifying obscure points and incorrect statements on the part of the original writer.

"Appendices" is the distinct feature of the translation, where the original Chinese quotations are given with the Japanese reading and an English rendering. The reviewer is not a philologist, but to his mind there is no language so difficult as the Chinese (including Japanese) to translate into any of the European languages. This is particularly the case with its philosophical terms. They are so rich in implications, and their shades of nuance so delicate, that when they are rendered into another language highly characterized by abstractions the original subtleties are lost. I doubt if there are many European scholars who can really understand the Chinese language. To give just one example from "Ap-

pendices," we have (p. 48), *"kokoro ni buji ni, ji ni mushin naraba,"* for which the original German has, as Mrs. Sasaki translates it, "Only let no thing remain in your mind and no mind remain in the thing," whereas the translator gives "Only when you have no thing in your mind and no mind in things."[1] I wonder whether these renderings convey any intelligible sense to English readers who know nothing of the Chinese. This saying of Tokusan expresses the highest point of Zen life. When we understand it we finish the study of Zen. And how inane and senseless these English translations sound! I have no space here, but some day I may write a thesis on the subject. Mrs. Sasaki will also, I hope, find time to elucidate the idea implied, not only in Tokusan's saying but in other masters' "unrelated and absurd" sayings expressive of their "conceits."

It may be added that the quotation on page 63 is wrongly translated. It should read: "Cherish no memory, have no concern about anything *(dharma),* good or bad, worldly or unworldly . . ." and not "the good and the non-good, the worldly life and the religious life, and all other dharmas. . . ."

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

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Buddhism and Zen. By NYOGEN SENZAKI and RUTH STROUT MCCANDLESS. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 91 pp. $3.75.

Zen in the Art of Archery. By EUGEN HERRIGEL. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. 109 pp. $2.00.

In English, the term Zen when used alone has come to have several meanings: a particular school of Buddhism; a form of meditation; a kind of religious experience; ultimate reality; all or any of these meanings in combination. An instance of this latter inclusive meaning is the volume, *Buddhism and Zen,* compiled, edited, and translated by Nyogen Senzaki and Ruth Strout McCandless.

From its use in this title, the word Zen would seem to suggest its first meaning—that of a particular Buddhist sect. And, indeed, in her introduction Mrs. McCandless does sketch that emergence within general Buddhism known as Zen Buddhism. In the body of the work, however, there soon appears a section headed "Notes On Meditation." This is a

1. Cf. D. T. Suzuki, *Living by Zen,* pp. 133 ff.

discussion of Zen meditation: what it is and what it is not; of correct posture and breathing; and of other aids which facilitate the desired concentration and effortlessness. For, as Mr. Senzaki, himself a Zen monk and teacher, declares, "in your meditation you should aim at nothing" (p. 60). And, in the words of Dogen, a thirteenth century Japanese Zen master: "Zen meditation is . . . peacefulness and blessedness itself. . . . Do not work for emancipation . . . but allow the work itself to be emancipation" (pp. 22 f.).

Following these "Notes," and constituting the major portion of the book, is the poem of an eighth century Chinese Zen master. This poem, of some fifty odd stanzas, here entitled "Shodoka (Song of Realization)," has been translated twice previously: by D. T. Suzuki as "Yoka Daishi's 'Song of Enlightenment,' " appearing in his *Manual of Zen Buddhism* (Kyoto, 1935); and by W. Liebenthal—using a slightly different text—as "Yung-chia's Song of Experiencing the Tao," appearing in *Monumenta Serica,* Vol. VI (1941). From these various translations of the title, it is evident that what is concerned is the Zen experience of enlightenment. That is should be expressed in the third version as the experiencing of the Tao may seem odd until it is realized that much Taoist terminology was adapted by early Chinese Zen literature, in which the term Tao was used frequently to designate ultimate reality. But if Tao does appear in one title, the body of the poem itself—in the present version—asserts: "One who attains Zen must acquire its eloquence" (p. 48); "A Zen student walks in Zen and sits in Zen" (p. 51). Here, clearly, it is the term Zen which is intended to designate ultimate reality—its fourth and final single meaning.

Mr. Senzaki's presentation of this poem, however, does not pretend to be literal or scholarly. It is rather—and herein lies its value and charm —a free and interpretive rendition accompanied by plain spoken and often entertaining comments. Thus, for example, following the lines: "The fearless thought of Zen is like the mighty roar of the lion, . . . Courageous students alone . . . hear the roar with calm pleasure" (p. 49), Mr. Senzaki then observes:

> This does not mean that he shouts. He is not an empty radio turned on at full volume. His speech is the result of his own hard work, and even though I reject his answer, his calmness is unbroken. Sometimes a student will bring a bag full of answers, trying one after another to fit the question, but he is like a pedlar in a vain attempt to please a customer. Instead of reaching the palace

of wisdom, he will return to his old alley of blind faith with all the stray cats that symbolize superstition (p. 49).

If *Buddhism and Zen* thus serves through its contents to illustrate the fifth or multiple meaning of the term Zen, the second volume under consideration, *Zen in the Art of Archery*, offers, through the relationship suggested by its title, a further illustration of this same usage. And again, it is the first meaning which is initially encountered. In an introductory statement, the author, Eugen Herrigel, maintains that it is from Zen Buddhism that the Japanese art of archery actually derives its "inner form" (p. 21). It was, in fact, through Mr. Herrigel's desire, while in Japan, to study Zen Buddhism that he found himself re-directed to archery. This short book, originally written in German, is an account of his experiences during six years of training under a Japanese master of that art. And in this training appears once more the role of meditation and concentration.

Not only did the master precede his own archery performance with a period of silent contemplation, but he also directly exhorted his students: "When you come to the lessons . . . you must collect yourselves. . . . Focus your minds on what happens in the practice hall. Walk past everything without noticing it, as if there were only one thing in the world that is important and real, and that is archery!" (p. 55). Further, a task early assigned was single-minded concentration on the correct breathing necessary to relaxation, effortlessness, and purposelessness. "Concentrate entirely on your breathing, as if you had nothing else to do!" (p. 40). "Don't think of what you have to do, don't consider how to carry it out! The shot will only go smoothly when it takes the archer himself by surprise. . . . You mustn't open the right hand on purpose" (p. 48). "The right art is purposeless, aimless! The more obstinately you try to learn how to shoot the arrow for the sake of hitting the goal, the less you will succeed. . . . What stands in your way is that you have a much too wilful will. You think that what you do not do yourself does not happen" (p. 51).

This latter declaration led Mr. Herrigel finally to ask:

"How can the shot be loosed if 'I' do not do it?"

" 'It' shoots," he replied.

. . . . . .

"How can I wait self-obliviously for the shot if 'I' am no longer there?"

" 'It' waits at the highest tension."

"And who or what is this 'It'? "

"Once you have understood that, you will have no further need of me. And if I tried to give you a clue at the cost of your own experience, I should be the worst of teachers . . ." (p. 76).

Thus does the master definitely affirm the necessity in archery of an experience in which the "I" is carried beyond itself into a non-dualized "It." This realization beyond the duality of the egoistic self and the world which confronts it as object is indeed the enlightenment experience. But at this point a precautionary reminder seems advisable, for while the non-duality between the self and its specific concern is the characteristic feature of any human art, such "artistic" non-duality always involves the self and some definite function. Religious non-duality, however, concerns not any special undertaking, but rather Life itself; not any particular content, and therefore all content. This distinction between "Zen" in the art of archery—or any discriminate human art—and "Zen" in the "art of life" is essential. The "Zen artist of life," as Dr. D. T. Suzuki states in his introduction to this volume:

> does not need, like the painter, a canvas, brushes, and paints; nor does he require, like the archer, the bow and arrow and target. . . . He has his limbs, body, head, and other parts. His Zen-life expresses itself by means of all these "tools." . . . His hands and feet are the brushes and the whole universe is the canvas on which he depicts his life . . . (p. 12).

This, of course, does not mean that archery—or any other activity—is removed from the realm of life. The "Zen artist of life" may express his "artistry" as well in archery as in "sleeping when tired, and eating when hungry." This relationship of Zen, as ultimate reality—beyond any special content—to the particular art of archery is fully understood by Mr. Herrigel's Japanese teacher, who at one point sharply admonished: "Put the thought of hitting right out of your mind! You can be a master even if every shot does not hit. The hits on the target are only the outward proof and confirmation of your purposelessness at its highest, of your egolessness, your self-abandonment, or whatever you like to call this state" (p. 82). "For this is what the art of archery means: a profound and far-reaching contest of the archer with himself" (p. 92).

He who can shoot with the horn of the hare and the hair of the tortoise, and can hit the center without bow (horn) and arrow (hair), he alone is Master in the highest sense of the word—Master of the artless art. Indeed, he is the artless art itself and thus Master and No-Master in one. At this point archery, considered as the unmoved movement, the undanced dance, passes over into Zen (p. 91).

And so, too, at this point, does Zen pass far beyond any semantic inquiry into its meanings as illustrated by books or other writings. For, finally, the only real meaning of Zen must be a meaning born of—and defined by—the Self in an ultimate awareness of Itself beyond the dualistic fragmentation of its ego-centered self-consciousness. Then it may be found that the meaning is beyond meaning, and the definition undefined, and that perhaps the very term Zen itself has vanished, and all that remains is the Self, standing alone in the boundlessness of its own total presence.

Richard De Martino

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Der Hebräische Mensch: Eine Skizze. By Ludwig Köhler. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1953. 181 pp.

No catastrophes seem to have interrupted the habits and ways of German Semitology. The distinguished Swiss theologian who is the author of this agreeably and imaginatively written little volume imperturbably quotes demographic statistics concerning the exterminated Jewries of Poland and Lithuania. Nothing has happened. The elegant and learned indoor sport goes on. For it is just that. The pages which seek to delineate the being and character of the ancient Hebrew, the *homo Hebraicus,* are peppered with *vielleicht* (perhaps), *wohl* (probably), *sicher* (assuredly), *müssen gewesen sein* (must have been); "we know *sozusagen nichts.* What difference is there between "so to speak, nothing" and plain "nothing?" Add to that the operating with unproved and probably unprovable assumptions: "this is early, this is late"; "this must have been added,"—and you have, in honest fact, a game. Finally, there is here, as so often, the semi-conscious desire to separate the ethics of the O.T. from those of the N.T. and to cut Jesus off from the continuity of the Hebrew-Pharisaic tradition.

In order to delineate the character of the ancient Hebrew, Dr. Köhler treats the entire epoch of both the O.T. and the N.T. as single and uniform, quoting Amos and the Acts of the Apostles as equal evidence on a given page. He draws upon the synoptic Gospels and upon the Pauline Epistles, and hence it seems extremely curious that he uses no Rabbinic sources, though it is obvious that the *Mishnah* had far deeper historic roots in Hebrew life.

Concerning the physical being, life-span and folk-ways of the ancient Hebrews Dr. Köhler does what he can with the naked documents. His picture of antique Hebrew youth as pure, stark, warlike is, one may amusedly suppose, meant to be a kind of compliment. In the two crucial chapters on *Das geistige Bild des Hebräers* (the Hebrew's moral and spiritual constitution), it leads him into some very deep and turbid waters. The ancient Hebrew, according to Dr. Köhler, was easily suggestible and morally stubborn at once; he was passionate beyond the habit and use of Nordic peoples; he was "no Greek," however, and suffered from "cosmic insecurity." At this *kosmische Unsicherheit* one gasps a little, as well as at the observation that the O.T. "knows no wisdom except practical wisdom." Thus, in quotation and delineation, Dr. Köhler omits what is surely, on the basis of the documents, the central and controlling conviction of the O.T., namely, that the Hebrew people is set apart from the other peoples by a direct act of God and that its entire life is to be subject to sanctification *(kedusha),* to holiness, by reason of the holiness of God (Lev. 19:1; 20; 4, 5; 23:1, 3, etc.). *Kedoshim thih'yu khi kadosh ani*—"ye shall be holy, even as I am holy," or (Lev. 20:26), "And ye shall be holy unto me *(li),* for I am holy, I, the Lord, and have separated you from the peoples that ye may be mine" *(li).*

What influence this conviction had on the life of the individual Hebrew we do not know. That it was corporately basic is historically demonstrated by the fact that the Pharisees, the *Perushim,* the separated ones, founded classical and living Judaism upon this eternal conviction. It was also basic to those aspects of Hebrew ethics which were utterly new in history, such as the identification of oneself with the sufferings of the world. "And ye shall love him (the co-dweller), for ye were co-dwellers in the land of Egypt" (Lev. 19:34 and elsewhere). This springs from the very core: (Lev. 22:32) *V'nikdashti b'toch bnei Yisrael*—"And I will be hallowed among the sons of Israel." And so, too, Dr. Köhler

omits the crucial concept of land ownership (Lev. 25:23), the concept that the land is God's, which is so deeply living in the consciousness of the Hebrew people that the modern organization for the purchase of land in Israel, the *Keren Kayemeth* (Perpetual Horn or Fund), that is, the well-known Jewish National Fund, is based upon it and is raising some millions of dollars from what is left of world Jewry in this very year.

In other words, semitological studies like Dr. Köhler's are divorced from both life and living history, above all, from human experience, and all merit the words with which Goethe reacted to the *Prolegomena* of F. A. Wolf, who first advanced the theory of the multiple authorship of the Homeric poems. "It's interesting," Goethe wrote to Schiller, "but I can't say that I was edified. . . . The trouble with these gentlemen is that, in order to protect their weak flanks, they are apt to lay waste the most fruitful gardens in the realms of beauty. . . . And in the end there is a much more powerful subjective element in this business than is usually supposed."

LUDWIG LEWISOHN

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Jew and Greek: A Study in the Primitive Church. By DOM GREGORY DIX. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. vii, 119 pp. $2.50.

This short book is the posthumous publication of a study of what Dom Gregory Dix himself called "The Problem of the Sub-Apostolic Church." The material he had originally prepared for lectures at the University of Uppsala in 1950, and, at the time of his death, he was intending to revise, rewrite, and expand this manuscript he left behind. The reader therefore, in a particular way, will recognize the loss to the world of theological learning of a scholar so imaginative and a writer so vivid and compelling.

The focus of Dom Gregory's attention is the crucial period of early Christian history, A.D. 30 to A.D. 60, but the background of his, as of any, discussion of this period is the clash of two great cultures, that of Hellenism and that of "Syria." (Dom Gregory follows Toynbee's use of the label "Syriac" as more correct, because more inclusive, than "Hebrew" or "Jewish.") These cultures had been clashing already for about a thou-

sand years, and Dom Gregory sees it continuing for another thousand, in the struggles of Saracen and crusader, of Caliphate and Byzantium. The significance of this clash between these two great cultures, whether for the first century or for men today, is to be found in the different way they expressed ideas about the meaning of life. The Hellenic mind sought to explain life "from within life, from the rational observation of men and things and events." Deity in relation to the world was Zeus, and the other gods; but ultimate Deity was in the blank beyond, a subject for speculation; even, as in Plato, an object or rather, *the* Object of contemplation, but not related to the drama of human life and history. For the Syrian mind, on the other hand, "the ultimate explanation of life always lies beyond human life, beyond history and time altogether —in God, conceived as 'the Living God.' "

Against this background, the early Church of the first generation, from A.D. 30 to A.D. 60, is seen as the historic locus where those two cultures "encountered one another in a quite peculiar way." Dom Gregory divides this period into the three decades: the first, A.D. 30-40, a period which, although obscure to us, obviously also was a period of growth and expansion. During these years Jesus was being proclaimed as Messiah within the framework of Syrian Judaism. The second decade, A.D. 40-50, saw "the historical situation" closing "in upon the Jewish Christian Church." Jewish Christian preaching, which was spreading "through Syria almost before S. Paul was converted, and which had reached far and fast beyond Syria while he was still quiescent at Tarsus," was also producing resentments, dissensions, and disorders. Dom Gregory refers to papyri evidence of disturbances in the Alexandrine ghetto, A.D. 42-43, as well as to the well-worn mention in Suetonius of the rioting in the Jewish quarters at Rome which led to the expulsion of many Jews *(impulsore Chresto)* from the city.

It was this tense and critical situation for Jewish Christianity which produced the ringing challenge of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Galatians. Although, as at Antioch, Gentile converts had been admitted to the Church without circumcision or the observance of the Law, a practice which apparently had been accepted by the Church at Jerusalem— the worsening of relations between Jew and Gentile had suggested to some, as in Galatia, that accommodation to the Law be expedient, "to save local Jewish Christians from local Jewish persecution." It is in his

discussion of this controversy which led up to the Council of Jerusalem in A.D. 49 that Dom Gregory is most original and suggestive. Driving a wedge between the various interpretations of the material of Galatians 3 and 4 and Acts, he suggests that the leaders of the Jewish Christian Church at Jerusalem, without publically endorsing St. Paul's position, nevertheless reaffirmed the policy of accepting Gentile converts as full members of the Christian Covenant.

The account in the Book of Acts, written many years later (ca. A.D. 90), even if it does not give St. Paul the credit historically due him, at least witnesses to the importance of the issue, and of the decision. It was, after all, St. Paul who forced the issue. For him, it involved the very character of the Gospel. It was to the children of the promises, St. Paul's own "kinsmen according to the flesh," that the Messiahship of Jesus had been revealed. "In the Messiah, and only in the Messiah, could the whole Syriac understanding of the world, the whole Jewish faith in God, be realized as the truth of God Himself in history." Yet the acceptance of this Messiahship involved the rejection of what Israel had understood by the promises of God. Thus the destiny of Israel was fulfilled as the historic form of it was destroyed. This is what St. Paul, himself "as concerns the Law a Pharisee," saw, and Dom Gregory's interpretation of St. Paul's thought is vivid and sympathetic as well as illuminating.

After the Council of Jerusalem, the floodgates were open, and Gentile Christianity spread like a flame. During the third decade, A.D. 50-60, there was the "leap" of the Church from the Syriac to the Greek world. "In Acts," as Dom Gregory points out, "S. Paul is presented as in some sort the dramatic symbol of this whole passage between two worlds." And this is right. For "the Epistles of S. Paul are the only Christian documents which have come down to us from the period when the Church was making its 'leap' from the Syriac to the Gentile world—while it was 'in mid-air,' so to speak."

Added to the discussion of the Jewish Christian Church, where perhaps most of the "meat" of the book is to be found, are two further short chapters, on "the Church of the Gentiles," and "the Gospel for the Greeks" respectively. Both describe and illustrate the process of translation. Translation involves the use of new words and new categories. Yet, in the translation of the Christian Gospel, the substance is

and has to be the same. "The cardinal ideas" of Christianity were "Syriac" and "non-Greek," but they had to make sense to Greek converts. This reviewer remembers many other comments, and illustrations of this process, which are part of the legacy Dom Gregory left to his friends and listeners and readers. There are various details which suggest criticism, and points of interpretation which challenge discussion, but it is sad to realize that the debate cannot continue here with Dom Gregory himself. We are grateful that, although Dom Gregory did not regard the work worthy of publication, the Abbot of Nashdom assured him to the contrary only twenty-four hours before his death in May 1952, and so secured for us this literary deposit of his scholarship. Canon H. J. Carpenter, Warden of Keble College, prepared the manuscript for publication, and to him we owe the present title and chapter headings.

URSULA M. NIEBUHR

Barnard College

Regularis Concordia Anglicae Nationis Monachorum Sanctimonialiumque (The Monastic Agreement of the Monks and Nuns of the English Nation). Edited and translated by DOM THOMAS SYMONS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. lix, 77 pp. $3.50.

The average treatise on general medieval history and even some devoted to church history present only the more familiar aspects of monastic development: the Benedictine Rule, the Cluny reform, St. Bernard and the Cistercians, and the friars of the thirteenth century. While such a summary may illustrate something of the remarkable vitality and variety of western monasticism, much is necessarily left out. Actually many lesser known local activities more or less related to the larger European movement not only hold great interest but made important permanent contributions. One such development, which took place in the tenth century in England, is associated with the names of three great monk-bishops, Ethelwold (d. 984), Dunstan (d. 988), and Oswald (d. 992). Moreover, as Dom David Knowles observed *(The Monastic Order in England,* p. 56), "they and their work have failed to receive due recognition in modern times."

It is highly appropriate, therefore, that this new volume in the new English *Medieval Classics* series, edited by H. Galbraith and R. A. B.

Mynors, should give us the Latin text and an English translation of the *Regularis Concordia*. For the latter, which was issued around 970, was one of the prime accomplishments of the tenth century English monastic revival. And it is equally appropriate that the editor should be Dom Thomas Symons, who has devoted many years of study to this document and the monastic movement it represents, and has long been preparing a complete edition. The most recent previous edition, as Dom David Knowles pointed out *(op. cit.,* p. 31, n. 1) did not utilize all the now known manuscripts.

The *Regularis Concordia* is a "consuetudinary or code of monastic law" designed to regularize the monastic usages of England and to promote further orderly growth. It was promulgated at the Synodal Council of Winchester (ca. 970), which had been summoned by King Edgar. As its title indicates, it represents an "agreement" among English ecclesiastics concerning the customs to be followed thereafter in English monasteries. The revival of which it was, in a sense, the culmination followed the bleak period of the Viking invasions when nearly all of England's earlier and brilliant monastic life had disappeared. It paralleled and owed much to contemporary movements abroad. As the editor remarks, "the close political connections between this country [England] and the Continent . . . had their counterpart in an increase of ecclesiastical intercourse . . . when a great monastic reform was beginning to spread throughout the Burgundian and Lotharingian lands" (p. xi). Moreover, Oswald's "work as a monastic reformer had the foreign element in it from the start." And the *Proem* explicitly states that monks were summoned from Fleury, where Oswald had stayed for a time, and from Ghent. And yet it seemed right to preserve much that was peculiarly English. It was this English background which "was the basis of the Dunstan-Ethelwold side of the movement." These usages, the editor holds, can be traced either to the previous Anglo-Saxon monasticism or to Dunstan's early days at Glastonbury. Among them were the prayers for the royal house, whose association with the English Church was especially close, and the particular emphasis on daily Communion. Further, "if it was Ethelwold who actually put together the *Concordia* as we know it . . . there can be little doubt that, behind all, it was Archbishop Dunstan who sensed the dangers of dissension, who conceived

the remedy—one common norm of observance—and who took the initial steps to ensure its application" (p. lii).

To understand the *Concordia* fully the reader should be familiar with the *Rule of St. Benedict,* for this is understood throughout and remained the foundation of western monasticism. Read with this background the *Concordia* will provide an intimate picture of the monk's daily round. The excellent English translation will make it available to all students, while the Latin text, with full critical apparatus and notes, will give the scholar the material an edition can supply. The introduction explains the origins, the historical background, and the manuscript-text problems of the document. There is an index and a plate reproducing a page of the Cotton MS showing King Edgar and Saints Dunstan and Ethelwold.

Produced in the best tradition of Benedictine scholarship, this volume is a valuable addition to the materials of monastic history and a credit both to the editor and to the general editors of the *Medieval Classics* series.

MARSHALL W. BALDWIN

New York University

English Art, 1100-1216. By T. S. R. BOASE. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. xxi, 331 pp. 19 fig., 96 pl. $10.00.

This is Volume III of the Oxford History of English Art of which two volumes have already appeared, the one immediately preceding this, which covers the period from 871-1100, by D. Talbot Rice, and Volume V, from 1307-1461, by Joan Evans. The series, a parallel to the Oxford History of England, should, when complete in eleven volumes, be a most valuable one summarizing modern research on material that nowhere else has been collected in a single many volumed history.

Romanesque art in England has been overshadowed by the spectacular achievements of the same period in France. Yet the Norman conquerors, bringing with them the most developed and structurally experimental architectural style of France, and occasionally with Lombard help, built a succession of great cathedrals and abbeys which in

size and invention rival any in western Europe. Few, alas, survive without rebuilt choirs or naves, and all have lost their Romanesque façades, although at Tewkesbury and Lincoln one can still see the original frame, as in a few ruined abbeys. Much of the incessant rebuilding was due, of course, to the disastrous fires which plagued almost every medieval church, to which the English ones with their wooden ceilings were particularly vulnerable. The great fire of 1174 which destroyed the choir of Canterbury is vividly described by a contemporary, Gervase, and brings to life the splendor and horror of the scene. Durham Cathedral, consequently, with its vaulted nave, occupies a unique position, not only for the preservation of the original building in aisles and nave but also because, by the use of both ribs and pointed arches in the nave vault (ca. 1115), it challenges "the primacy of France in the Gothic Style somewhat as Constable threatens the French origin of impressionism." It remains, granting priority to S. Ambrogio in Milan, "the first example in northwest Europe of a major building roofed throughout with ribbed vaulting." Geometric ornament carved on the piers, and an interlacing arcade on the aisle walls, also give us some idea of the rich play of light and shade only too frequently lost, the author reminds us, when the original bands of painting are scraped away and huge windows of later Perpendicular building let in a flood of light to cool grey interiors where once was warmth of color and the gleam of jewels and precious metals, gloom punctuated by suspended crowns of light over the altars. The treatment of the nave wall halfway between the thin wall of Jumièges and "the hollow wall" with a tribune gallery of St. Etienne at Caen is well analyzed, and the appearance, also from Normandy, of quadrant vaults at triforium level buttressing the nave, but no mention is made of the use of a seven-part vault with the alternate system, a solution unique with Durham.

Other churches receive much less adequate treatment. The naves of Ely and Peterborough and the west towers of Lincoln are mentioned briefly but not illustrated. Iffley, although called "one of the most perfect of our smaller Romanesque buildings," and which is an excellent document of a small parish church, is given one plate and a sentence about its façade. It would, in fact, be very difficult to get any coherent idea of Norman building from this book. This is partly due to the organization. Starting regionally with a chapter on Durham,

which includes the north, then one on Canterbury, really the south, Reading and the west country, St. Albans and the east, it goes into a chronological system, ending with the late Romanesque period, the Gothic style, and the Classic Revival. Architecture, sculpture, and manuscripts are thus treated together. Illustrations are few, and by far the lion's share, more than half, goes to manuscripts.

Sculpture also suffers. Granted that England has no surviving portals to rival Moissac, Autun, and Vézelay, there would seem all the more reason to illustrate the few monuments that remain. One looks in vain for the Prior's Gate at Ely, the tympanum of Dinton and its companions, while the porch at Malmesbury, although its reliefs are called "the most remarkable pieces of English stone work that have come down to us from the twelfth century," are represented by the figure of a single apostle. This is all the more to be regretted as Mr. Boase's observations as with architecture are usually astute.

Fresco painting has to a large extent perished, but only one fresco is illustrated, the Christ in Glory in the Chapel of St. Gabriel in the crypt of Canterbury, and while mention is made of the accompanying scenes, the reader gets no impression of a series. Chaldon, Stowell, and Claverley are omitted completely; Hardham, Clayton, and Copford barely mentioned. All of these churches have important fresco cycles, well illustrated by E. W. Tristam in *English Mediaeval Wall Painting*. Ivories and enamels are also similarly neglected.

It is with illuminated manuscripts that the author is obviously most at home, and it is in this branch that English artists excelled. Sometimes in monumentality suggesting the lost frescoes, as in the Bury Bible or the great Lambeth Bible of the frontispiece, they often achieve superb imaginative designs as in the Psalters of Glasgow and Copenhagen, where the balance of wings and scrolls, the patterns of voids and solids are unsurpassed even by the greatest of Ottonian manuscripts. The peculiar genius of the English illuminator, however, appears in the innumerable figured initials, in the fantasy of "the inhabited scroll and gymnastic initial where climbing figures fill the bar of the letter" and in the crisply curling leaves with petals growing more luxuriant until, in the third part of the century, they reach "a baroque magnificence of elaborate formalization." Cat masks, owls and other

birds, and human heads grow from the stems at unexpected places. Innumerable scriptoria were working each with its own peculiar mannerisms and traditions, but it is hard to see a marked contrast in regional styles.

Perhaps, with such a general survey, disappointment over the omissions is inevitable. Illustrations seem far too few, but that is obviously the limitation of the series. References to them, however, need not be put at the end of a long description, but should, for the convenience of the reader, come, as in the other volumes, immediately after the object is mentioned. Also, this reviewer could discover no system to the arrangement of plates, which seem to jump around needlessly.

When all is said, however, this is a book of great erudition and balanced judgment, clouded by no narrow nationalism. English art was Norman, and essentially one style prevailed throughout the king's domains on both sides of the Channel.

MARION LAWRENCE

Barnard College

The Sermons of John Donne. Edited with introductions and critical apparatus by EVELYN M. SIMPSON and GEORGE R. POTTER. Vol. VI. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953. viii, 374 pp. $7.50.

This volume, the sixth of the projected ten volume edition of the sermons of John Donne, is the second in order of publication. The remaining eight volumes will appear at the rate of two a year and will include all of the 160 sermons now known to be extant. For a general estimate of this superb edition and some considerations on Donne as a preacher and divine, I refer the reader to my review of Volume I in this journal, November, 1953. Volume VI includes eighteen sermons from the middle period of Donne's activity as a preacher, and they are dated from May, 1623 to January, 1626. It also includes, according to the editorial plan to be followed for each of the volumes, an introduction describing the sermons themselves, the occasions on which they were preached, and the circumstances in which they were composed and delivered. Textual notes and variants are included in an appendix. The lengthy textual, bibliographical and historical essays which serve as a

general introduction to this edition were all relegated to the first volume.

This volume will be of considerably more interest to the general reader than the first, since it contains some of the very finest of Donne's work. He will here be able to discover the mature preacher and artist in all of his wide range, from the charming, simple first sermon preached at St. Dunstans (No. 3 in this volume) in which Donne sets forth his conception of the mutual duties of a clergyman and his congregation, to the magnificent Christmas Day sermon of 1624 (No. 8) in which Donne displays all of his linguistic virtuosity. The latter contains a passage, quoted and analyzed by the editors in their excellent introduction and frequently found in anthologies, which George Saintsbury thought was very nearly the most "exquisitely rhythmed" passage in the whole of English literature "from Aelfric to Pater." It is fairly long, but a small sample will give the reader some idea of Donne's ability to control the rhythms of language, varying and modulating them to build climaxes of great power. It begins:

> God made Sun and Moon to distinguish seasons, and day, and night, and we cannot have the fruits of the earth but in their seasons: But God hath made no decree to distinguish the seasons of his mercies; In paradise, the fruits were ripe, the first minute, and in heaven it is alwaies Autumne, his mercies are ever in their maturity . . . .

and gradually works into a sonorous *coda*

> . . . though in the wayes of fortune, or understanding, or conscience, thou have been benighted till now, wintred and frozen, clouded and eclypsed, damped and benummed, smothered and stupified till now, now God comes to thee, not as in the dawning of the day, not as in the bud of the spring, but as the Sun at noon to illustrate all shadows, as the sheaves in harvest, to fill all penuries, all occasions invite his mercies, and all times are his seasons.

Sermon Five in this volume is an undated Whitsunday sermon which, while not of much interest from a literary point of view, illustrates Donne's frequent use of metaphors and *exempla* drawn from the technology, science, and medicine of his time, a practice which set him apart from many of his great contemporaries who worked in a more conservative homiletic tradition, drawing illustrative material from less intellectual sources, from nature and common experience rather than from contemporary stores of learning. He refers in this case to

the Paracelsian doctrine of a "naturall Balsamum," and "intrinsique balme" and preservative which man's body possesses as a natural endowment, and which is the physiological principle behind natural healing. Donne seizes on this bit of contemporary medical lore to make the point that, spiritually speaking, we have no "naturall Balsamum" but a "natural poyson in us, Originall sin." We cannot heal ourselves in the realm of spirit, but stand in need of divine grace. The analogy is carefully worked out to explain this doctrine. A modern clergyman who chooses his illustrations from the works of Eddington, Jeans, or Carrel will find, in this respect, a kindred spirit in Donne.

There is also the fine sermon preached to King Charles soon after the death of his father, and the sermon preached at Denmark House before the body of King James, both examples of Donne's more subdued manner. The final sermon of the volume (No. 18) preached at St. Dunstans after the congregation had returned to London from an "Exodus" because of the plague, is an excellent example of one of Donne's characteristic traits, his grim fascination with the horrors of death and his extraordinary imaginative capacity—almost a compulsive need—to reveal death "in His true rank and order."

It is an unusual spirit indeed that can tell a congregation of mourners "Every puff of wind within these walls, may blow the father into the sons eys, or the wife into her husbands, or his into hers, or both into their childrens, or their childrens into both. Every grain of dust that flies here, is a piece of a Christian;" and follows this with the resounding affirmation: "But there was a part in every one of them, that could not die; which the God of life, who breathed it into them, from his own mouth, hath suck'd into his own bosome." The passage is typical of the dramatic juxtapositions, the striking imagery and the utter honesty with which Donne faced both the sheer negation of death and the consoling affirmations of faith without falsifying either. The volume, in spite of some dull stretches, is filled with passages of great beauty, perceptions which compel reflection, and even the divisions and analyses of texts will be interesting to those who, with Coleridge, admire the "manhood of our Church divinity."

Joseph A. Mazzeo

Columbia University

Lyman Abbott, Christian Evolutionist: A Study in Religious Liberalism. By IRA V. BROWN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. ix, 303 pp. $5.00.

Ira V. Brown, Assistant Professor of History at Pennsylvania State College, has written a clear, straightforward, thoroughly objective account of the Reverend Lyman Abbott's social thought. By patiently scrutinizing Abbott's voluminous writings, particularly those in the enormously influential *Outlook,* the weekly news magazine which Abbott edited from 1876 until his death in 1922, and by relating this body of writing to the changes in American life of that long, eventful period, Professor Brown has given us a worthwhile study.

While acknowledging Abbott's role in the remarkable readjustment of theology to the demands of modern industrial life, Brown describes Abbott more often as "clay" rather than a "potter." Inspired as Abbott was by Emerson's motto, "Our part is to conspire with the new works of new days," he generally allowed himself to be guided by the main trends and forces of his time. In his role as editor of the appropriately-named *Outlook,* he characteristically espoused mediating views in regard to Negro slavery, Southern reconstruction, Darwinism, the Indian question, urban and factory problems, higher criticism, the social gospel, and World War I. In the major controversies of his lifetime, Abbott "belonged, as usual, with those in the center position . . . an evolutionist but not a Darwinian, a religious liberal but not an agnostic, an anti-slavery man but not an abolitionist, a temperance advocate but not a prohibitionist, an industrial democrat but not a socialist" (pp. 167, 234). As a close associate of Theodore Roosevelt, he held the middle ground firmly and steadily.

In this role, Abbott was bound to reflect many of the forward-looking and backward-reaching trends of his time. Although one of the most effective early social gospelers in America, he nevertheless manifested ethnocentric views in regard to the Indian, non-Christian faiths, and colonial populations. Also, like most churchmen, "he preached war in the name of the Prince of Peace" during World War I. In analyzing these ambiguous attitudes and acts, Professor Brown is admirably meticulous.

"Evolutionary Theology," the most rewarding chapter in the book,

suggests that Abbott "made his most significant contributions . . . in persuading many thoughtful Christians that the theory of evolution, far from demolishing genuine religion, actually purified and strengthened it." Profoundly influenced by the great Henry Drummond, Abbott "drew analogies between the principles of biology and those of religion," asserting that "Christian love was steadily displacing pagan selfishness and transforming the earth into the Kingdom of God" (pp. 139 ff., 143). Of course, this "romantic" view is derided today by fundamentalists, revivalists, millenarians, and the suddenly powerful neo-orthodox, but another strong plea should be entered for it. Men like Abbott can say a great deal to us today. Their message of hope, based on "divine love" rather than "divine law," fulfills a constructive need in man.

For example, today when religious-minded educators are striving to reach college groups, it is worth reviewing Abbott's notable success as a college preacher. Holding the conviction that "there was more faith in honest doubt than in half the creeds," often quoting earnest secular writers like Tennyson, Arnold, and Mill, frequently sounding like Emerson and Whitman, Abbott won thousands of young college students at such institutions as Smith, Fisk, Vanderbilt, Wisconsin, Yale, Cornell, Wellesley, and Harvard to a liberal religious faith.

His "serene personality," as well as his thoughtful and literate delivery, attracted listeners. The rare glimpses afforded us of Lyman Abbott as a person rather than an editor inspire respect and provoke great curiosity. A man who can be described on his seventy-fifth birthday as "stepping lightly and radiantly along with a clear, strong mind, a beautiful spirit of peace and faith, and a gentleness and courtesy of manner which make him very dear to us" deserves closer personal study than this book contains. Ira Brown, a talented church historian, was mainly interested in uncovering "a main current of American religious thought" in Lyman Abbott, a "typical figure," so to speak. Thus, Lyman Abbott's biography remains unwritten—the task of discovering the source of his unusual grace and equilibrium still beckons.

Joseph Schiffman

Long Island University

Truth and Revelation. By NICOLAS BERDYAEV. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. 156 pp. $2.50.

This is the third book published since 1950 posthumously from the pen of the celebrated Russian Orthodox philosopher-theologian, Nicolas Berdyaev. The appendix lists some thirty-five "principal works" he has written, beginning in 1900. Perhaps, like Gabriel Marcel, he is at his best when grappling with special problems such as technics or Communism, or in the penetrating and enriching suggestions found within his writings, rather than in the whole sweep and structure of his thought. The main strands which enter into the web of Berdyaev's thinking were decisively revealed in his *Dostoevsky* (1923) and developed most fully and powerfully in *The Destiny of Man* (1931). The present volume cannot be said to add many facets to his thought not already familiar to theological readers, nor to give greater pungency and force to his position or clear up the remaining problems which have often enough been pointed out in reviews and articles.

Nevertheless, this book may serve as a good introduction to new readers who desire to begin with the author's later works, and for everyone it will prove a valuable summary of many of his constant themes. The chapter headings, which indicate in a number of phrases the topics to be considered, are not in this instance short enough to give the reader a rapid survey of the movement of the book as a whole. The first two chapters, I should say, present Berdyaev's existentialist interpretation of spiritual experience and his view of truth as subjectivity. Here at the outset, and throughout, the problem for the critical reader is whether an essentially mystical view of experience and of truth (he speaks, for example, of the primary reality as beyond the separation of subject and object) and his mainly Kantian view of man (he speaks, for example, of "transcendental man" and of the dualism between phenomena and noumena) can really be harmonized with the authentic existential motifs in his thought.

There follows a chapter on the meaning of revelation in which the concept of spirituality is opposed to all historicism, anthropomorphism, sociomorphism, and cosmomorphism. Again, one wonders whether, out of a quite justifiable objection to the "objectification" of revelation, the

author does not go too far in altogether removing historical revelation and the encounter which a truly existential type of theology manages to retain and, indeed, emphasizes. "It is what may be called the *gnostic* idea of creative power," Berdyaev confesses, which "has been the principal theme of my life and my thought from the time when I wrote *The Meaning of Creativeness* onwards" (i.e., from 1916).

The central chapters of the volume are those in which Berdyaev employs his conception of the transcendent freedom of the human spirit to demolish all views which make man's being or essence primary and western theology which installs God as the creative "cause" and "providence" of this world. Again, he effects a decisive "break with the forensic interpretation of Christianity and redemption" and with the belief in Hell. (The latter, indeed, is given one helluva going-over!) In passing there is an exceedingly fine chapter on "New Forms of Godlessness," which considers with a good deal of insight contemporary humanistic philosophies of hope and of despair as the "Godlessness of the day and the Godlessness of the night." The book concludes on a spiritualized eschatological note: "The Revelation of the Spirit and the Age of the Spirit."

Two chief criticisms may here be subjoined: One is that Berdyaev wrongly regards his view of an "uncreated freedom" as the only alternative to theological bondage. He presumes, but does not demonstrate, that "created freedom" necessarily implies that God creates whatever finite freedom does, just as surely as divine foreknowledge requires predestination. Secondly, the notion of "God-manhood" which crowns Berdyaev's interpretation of spiritual truth or revelation proves on close inspection to have little illuminating power and only linguistic orthodoxy. The concept has almost no connection with the God-Man, but seems rather to mean that that which is generically divine became, or always was, generically human. Thus God, man, and Christ disappear as persons or individuals in a cloud of spirituality called "divine-humanity." It helps not at all for Berdyaev to say that "true and deep anthropology is the revelation of the christology of man," since it is dubious whether his Christology is Christological.

PAUL RAMSEY

Princeton University

Christianity and Existentialism. By J. M. Spier. Translated from the Dutch by D. H. Freeman. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953. xix, 140 pp. $3.00.

Existentialism and the Modern Predicament. By F. H. Heinemann. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. vi, 211 pp. $3.50.

These two studies make a considerable contribution to the understanding and refinement of existential philosophy. One is by a Dutch pastor, the other by a German philosopher currently teaching at Oxford. While both volumes are appreciative of existentialism, Pastor Spier deplores its distance from Christianity, and Professor Heinemann deplores its default from serious philosophical responsibility.

Taken together, the volumes broaden the scope which customary approaches to the subject have outlined. Each devotes a chapter to the best known existentialists: Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Marcel, and Sartre. Spier includes Nietzsche, and Heinemann includes Berdyaev. The most valuable contribution in Spier is the access he affords to evaluations by little known thinkers from his part of the world. A fifty-eight-year old Dutch philosopher named Loen is interpreted in a chapter entitled "Theistic Existentialism." There is also a chapter on the French philosopher, Louis Lavelle. Heinemann, on the other hand, continues the useful and technically informed analysis which he gave of existentialism in a volume written in 1929, entitled *Neue Wege der Philosophie.* His chapter on Husserl, "The Loneliness of the Transcendental Ego," is a particularly sensitive treatment of this most esoteric of all the philosophical backgrounds of existentialism.

If readers sense a weakness in the studies, it will probably be attributable to manifest biases peculiar to each volume. These slants are developed and defended in extensive concluding sections of each of the books. They are also clearly at work throughout the elaboration of the existential viewpoints and lead the authors into unfortunate distortions. In the judgment of this reviewer, the vitality of the existential position as presented in the expositions survives both the distortions and the refutations.

Spier can accept nothing in existentialism as philosophically valid which does not in some way corroborate his Christian faith, which is a

curious kind of Dutch biblicism. One who might concur in this attitude as a churchman could find it harder to approve as a philosophical method. And few churchmen will take seriously a theological method which, like Spier's, rejects even Karl Barth as heterodox.

Spier's rather undialectical attitude toward truth leaves him embracing both horns of a dilemma, in the presence of which Christian interpreters of existentialism usually feel obliged to choose. At one time he rejects the philosophy because its roots are humanistic rather than Christian (p. 90). At another time he rejects it because it is a "secularization of the absoluteness of Christianity" (pp. 134 f.). Contemporary theologians will find it strange that Spier prefers Dutch Christianity's legalism to existentialism's creative ethics, a static concept of the human soul reminiscent more of scholastic philosophy than of the Bible and the Reformers to existentialism's dynamic anthropology, and a seventeenth century concept of cosmic law to existentialism's terrifying universe. Spier rejects existentialism's subjectivism, its individualism, and its nihilism and sense of alienation, because he expects a philosophy to be written out of Christian answers. The fondness of Christian theologians for existentialism, however, is generally based on the feeling that here is a philosophy which raises the kinds of questions for which the Christian faith has been proposing answers all along. As such, existentialism does not annihilate the Christian faith by supplanting it, nor does it render itself comical by pretending to visions properly beyond the perspective of philosophers.

Heinemann's discussion is colored by philosophical interests which have been thrust upon him by his residence in England, where logical positivism is the philosophy of the schools. This adds some strength to the volume, for Heinemann sees in existentialism large areas of meaning which the linguistic and mathematical methods of logical positivism generally deny to philosophy. At the same time, many of the philosophical demands which Heinemann judges to be unfulfilled in existentialism are demands which exist only where logical positivists are both judge and jury.

Existentialism, he claims, cannot have an adequate logic, science, or value system. In order to say that it has not now an adequate logic, he strains at a rejection of Jaspers' logic, *Von der Wahrheit,* for the way in which it plays fast and loose with canons of logic once-for-all estab-

lished by Aristotle. (Aristotle would be the last, however, to endorse the *ad hominem* procedures which Heinemann directs against the existentialists, particularly Heidegger, Marcel, and Sartre. See pp. 102, 151, 183.) That it has no science is obvious from its preoccupation with subjectivity, but to make his case Heinemann simply asserts philosophy's role as science without grappling either with the existential limitation of philosophy to wisdom or with the trans-objective view of nature which the existentialists conserve from Greek metaphysics and the Hebrew-Christian tradition. To say it has no value system is obviously not to say it has no ethic, though Heinemann seems almost naïvely disconcerted by the prospect of an ethic without laws, curiously labels Berdyaev "anarchist," and, though avowedly moved by the ethical force in Sartre's writings, remains homesick for the *Nichomachean Ethics.*

Both of these interpreters err factually and over-reach themselves as interpreters when they account for existentialism almost solely as a reaction to cultural factors. Heinemann is transparently at fault in suggesting that existentialism pretends to be "a self-sufficient philosophy" (p. 181), rejects "the whole philosophical tradition of the west" (p. 182), and "wants to live without God" (p. 184).

Spier understands the spirit of existentialism better than Heinemann, probably because of his Christian sensitivities. Heinemann understands the technicalities better, because of his disciplined philosophical training. Heinemann's misunderstanding is professionally the more culpable, and the cardinal instance of his misunderstanding can be read on page 129, where he contrasts, in columns suitable for classroom blackboard display, five elements in the viewpoints of Jaspers and Sartre. I submit that a fair understanding would read the columns as synonymous rather than antithetical. Second only to this as a misunderstanding, is his judgment that existential philosophies are philosophies of liberation rather than philosophies of freedom (p. 167). In that judgment he misses the opportunity to detect what is probably the cardinal contribution in existentialism to the perennial philosophy, its redefinition of freedom. Freedom as liberation is a category which Spier also, schooled as he is in Calvin, should well appreciate as a point of contact in existentialism with Christianity.

CARL MICHALSON

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Christianity and the Problem of History. By Roger Lincoln Shinn. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. xiv, 302 pp. $4.50.

Professor Shinn presents in brief compass an excellent compendium of Christian views of history, reviewing the chief Christian doctrines, from Augustine to Niebuhr, of the dynamic of history,—a dynamic dependent upon the sovereignty of God, oriented in eschatological hope, and channeled through the "divine society."

Neo-Thomism's "increased concern with history" is reviewed in the thinking of men such as Baron von Hügel, Christopher Dawson, and Maritain. Subsumed under the concept of *total simultaneity* or timelessness, which pertains to the transhistorical divine being (p. 55), is the *partial simultaneity* of God's creatures, "i.e., they can in a limited way unite past and future in the experience of the present; and this partial simultaneity rests in God's pure simultaneity" (p. 168). It is the limitation of partial simultaneity which makes possible the actualization of the dynamic of the Incarnation in purposeful historical sequence.

Secular interpretations of history are examined, evaluated, and contrasted with the Christian doctrine of a transcendental God who is both beyond history and, providentially, within history. Philosophical theories are rejected primarily for their inadequate ideas of meaning. "The religious idea of meaning is usually somewhat more inclusive than naturalism's, somewhat less rationally ambitious than idealism's" (p. 16). The idea of progress in secular thought is also attacked, and, in this connection, what is said of Walter Marshall Horton is equally applicable to the author, viz., "He [Horton] has moved from a youthful belief that progress and providence were the same to a faith in a providence which is largely inscrutable, but which may often be better recognized in the overthrow of corrupt institutions than in smooth progress" (p. 128). The author rejects secularistic eschatologies, fundamentally because the autonomy of man is presupposed by them (cf. pp. 145 ff.). Of course, such a criticism holds only if one assumes the truth of the contrary, namely, the truth of man's creatureliness. The acceptance of one of these presuppositions does not establish the falsity of the other, and there is much to be said for either one as, for example, the "attempt at a Christian-Marxist Synthesis" would seem to suggest (pp. 141 ff.).

Christianity, in its variant shades of doctrine and principles of interpretation, is focused upon the *problem* of history. For Professor Shinn, the problem is the problem of meaning. "Meaning" is, for him, the dynamic teleological character of human history, rooted in the sovereign power of God and to be consummated in the attainment of the eschatological hope. Moreover, the author places man in a Christocentric predicament for, apart from Christian faith, there can be no "meaning" in history, the particularism of Christianity to the contrary notwithstanding. It is to the *logos* doctrine as expressed in Augustine that Professor Shinn turns in support of the assertion that "Christ is the answer to man's universal predicament" (p. 40). And it is in the context of Christian faith that "the unintelligibilities of history . . . are invested with meaning" (p. 270).

Although the author makes a careful preliminary distinction between his usage of "meaning" and its usage in implicatory relations of logic and in procedures of empirical verification, he nevertheless confuses the several meanings of meaning. Thus, he states that "Revelation . . . has a content but its content is recognized in encounter and cannot be equated with the propositions in which men try to express it . . . but every element in theology's mythological representations must have specific relation to the realities of historical experience" (pp. 17, 18, 21).

From the author's point of view, however, the interchangeable use of the various meanings of "meaning" can be justified by two assumptions: first, "*meaning* is an Ur-word; it is the basis, not the conclusion of thought and definition" (p. 16); second, "It is the Christian conviction that in certain crises of history insights are found—in the language of faith, are revealed—which offer a glimmer of understanding, which do something to make sense of the whole, or to offer men salvation through the struggles of history" (p. 17). Is this forcing a fictitious unity, or a fictitious ground of unity, into history? Professor Shinn is clearly aware of the important implications of this question for the validity of the apologetic passages of his book, since he concludes "the Christian interpretation cannot demonstrate its truth . . . it is itself a confession of faith. . . . A Christian interpretation of history, a Christian faith in the sovereignty of God offers and demands a way of life. Within it men may order their lives; for its faith they may—as they

have done and continue to do—live and die. Few men would do this for their theory of epistemology or historical causation" (p. 271).

One may have no quarrel with this statement, *provided* the author grants that the Christian interpretations of history, including his own neo-orthodox position, are explanatory accounts. For they are not empirical theories of history in the ordinary sense, evolved from the matrix of factual data. Rather, they are valuational constructions woven into the fabric of history from without, as it were. It is when Christian interpretations have been believed to have the latter kind of significance that they have become "meaningful," in the author's sense of the word,—and thereby they have become also the focal points of sacrificial loyalty. But secular ideologies as well as Christian interpretations have become "meaningful,"—sometimes ominously meaningful, sometimes gloriously meaningful. Neither the secular nor the Christian eschatologies, as such, are empirical theories "of epistemology or historical causation," as the author recognizes in his account of Marxism (cf. pp. 145 ff.).

In so far as Professor Shinn does implicitly acknowledge the axiological character of Christian interpretations, he may be said to have realized his expressed hope, namely, that he might offer in this study "some help to understanding and appropriating past and present Christian thought about history" (p. viii).

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Dialectic. By Gustav E. Mueller. New York: Bookman Associates, 1953. 234 pp. $4.00.

Dialectic is both an arresting and a bewildering book. Mueller has something of importance to say on every topic he introduces, and he invariably expresses it in an engaging way. And yet there is bewilderment as well, arising in large measure from the fact that the book is a collection of articles written at different times and for differing purposes, woven together with some new material appearing for the first time. In all fairness, it must be said that the book has a unity which is remarkable in view of its origin, and yet the reader will be disappointed because, despite the Prologue which tells us how the book grew, large parts of it did not grow at all, since they were fully grown

before they became part of the book. This means that the closely knit character of a superior philosophical discussion is frequently lacking.

Mueller begins by acknowledging his philosophical indebtedness to Haeberlin, Nicolai Hartmann, Husserl, and Jaspers. About Haeberlin I cannot speak, but as regards the others, their influence is evident. The most important influence, however, is not mentioned explicitly, and that is Hegel (although Kant is never far out of things; see pp. 97, 101 esp.). The argument is determined throughout by Hegelian philosophy and it is only the inclusion of more recent insights, as well as the acute way in which Hegel's dialectic is applied to present problems, that saves the book from being repetitive of past thought. One might call Mueller a latter-day Hegelian who has successfully combined dialectic with the insights of the philosophy of existence and the development of modern science.

As the subtitle indicates, the book outlines "a way into and within philosophy," and the key to both of these movements is the concept of dialectic. Mueller follows Hegel to the letter in maintaining that dialectic is not a system of "mere ideas" but a structure of forms which actuates all that is. If thought is to possess unity with what it thinks while at the same time grasping that content as something which is also other than itself, thought must be dialectical in character. It is in this sense that dialectic is said to be the method or logic of philosophy. "The aim of philosophy," says Mueller, "is the universe" (p. 55), and dialectic expresses the dual character of the universe as being neither a "fact" nor a "mere idea," that is to say, as neither an other totally beyond comprehension, nor something so completely transparent as to be wholly reducible to an idea. The real is the identity of both in process and tension, and dialectic is the only logical form which can adequately express such a movement.

Mueller's account of the nature and development of philosophy differs from Hegel's account just to the extent to which an *anthropological* emphasis replaces the ever present *theological* motif of the Hegelian dialectic. For Hegel, the absolute subject (which is at the same time the absolute *Idee*) is the one reality expressing itself in all the dialectical forms. Mueller, on the other hand, in an attempt to bring man, and particularly the concrete individual, into greater prominence, frequently writes as if dialectic were derivative from human consciousness and man's capacity for self-transcendence. In

one place we are told that "philosophy . . . is the rational reflection on the values of human existence in reality," and that it "emerges out of a human question which betrays a state of uncertainty" (p. 45); or again, "the question of philosophy . . . is the problem of man" (p. 46; cf. p. 33). Moreover, it is instructive in this regard that the volume ends with a chapter on man, the problematic being who illustrates the dialectical character of reality so well.

It would appear, although the author's excellent discussion of religion runs against the suggestion, that man is the final arbiter and judge of what is ultimate in so far as he is the being who experiences all the spheres of experience, including the religious, and passes judgment upon them. Yet, as will become clear, Mueller has a deep understanding of the concept of sin in classical Christianity and the disastrous consequences for man which come from his refusal to acknowledge norms and standards beyond himself and his own preferences.

The foregoing must suffice as an indication of the basic orientation of the book; there remains the task of discussing Mueller's position regarding the relation of religion to philosophy, and especially his interpretation of religion itself.

Of great importance is the fact that, unlike many philosophers, Mueller is acquainted with the development of actual religion, and consequently he is not confined in his outlook merely to what he may happen to prefer religion to be. The peculiar position of philosophy *vis à vis* religion is brought out in a passage which deserves wide attention. Mueller characterizes the peculiar dialectic of religion and philosophy in a way similar to that of Tillich's "boundary situation." Philosophy, he contends, stands between direct and naïve faith, on the one hand, and explicit skepticism and positivism, on the other. Philosophy comes to be rejected by both extremes because, whereas philosophy (and some types of theology too, of course) penetrates religion with reflection and discovers its symbolic character, each of the extremes takes religion in a wholly literal way. "Both," says Mueller, "refer to symbolic images literally, the one as literal revelation of God, the other as nonsense" (p. 26). This is a most significant point and, to my mind, constitutes one of the strongest arguments for a dialectical approach to the subject.

It is interesting in the extreme that the positivist, who is a sort of dogmatic theologian in philosophy, actually coincides with the

dogmatic theologian, who is a sort of positivist in theology; both are bent on having the "fact" and nothing but the fact, without the intrusion of any annoying dialectic which aims at showing that the situation is more complex than either side dares to admit.

Turning to the interpretation of religion, we may single out three topics as having central importance: the relation of religion to ethics; the analysis of sin as characteristic of the human situation; and the faith-relation, which, as Mueller contends, is not to be construed as subjective experience.

Some of the best analysis in the book concerns the nature of the ethical sphere, its internal dialectic and its subsequent relation to religion. The ethical sphere focuses on what ought to be preferred, chosen, and actualized over against what ought to be rejected and excluded. The religious sphere concerns the absolute ground of life and provides the ultimate standard from which the limited and broken character of human life is judged. "Ethics says: Affirm life! Religion says: Don't absolutize life, but affirm the absolute ground of life" (p. 155). From this brief statement it is clear that Mueller is well aware both of the distinctness of the two concerns and of their essential relation to each other. He refuses any attempt at reducing one to the other; religion must not become mere moralism (the brief discussion of Channing's theology makes Mueller's position clear in this regard; see pp. 204-9), nor should religion, on the basis of its insight into the insufficiency of all purely human endeavor, attempt to swallow the ethical sphere. To do so would be for religion to abscond, so to speak, from the world as it is and to give up its relevance to human activities and institutions. Mueller sees that when, for example, the attempt is made to "supplant the state by religion" the result is "a new organization, which behaves as if it were a state itself" (p. 226). Thus there is a polar tension between the two spheres, and this tension cannot be removed by destroying one of the poles in order to establish the absoluteness of the other.

Mueller is able to grasp the relation between the ethical and religious so clearly because he apprehends with equal clarity, the distinction between *sin* conceived as a state or way of being and *sins,* or particular failures to attain an ideal. Whether all sins are moral or not is another matter into which we cannot go, but it is true that a great deal of controversy over religion and its relation to ethics stems from

a failure to understand the basic distinction between these two. "Sin," says Mueller, "is the dialectic in which the divine Yes and the human No, the human Yes and the divine No, meet. Sin is not crime or primarily a moral issue at all. Sin is the pride of man to be his own master —*sicut deus . . .*" (p. 200). There can, I think, be no doubt that this statement adequately reflects the conception of classical Christianity on this head. There "sin" denotes a relation between God and man, a relation of separation or disharmony. It is best defined in terms of being and not of doing, although action will be involved as well. The drawing of this distinction does not, of course, resolve all the problems stemming from the close relation and conflict between the ethical and the religious, but it does help to avoid the sort of confusion which comes from failure to grasp the concept of sin in religious as distinct from ethical terms.

In considering the nature of religion itself, Mueller is led to distinguish three critical tendencies in modern thought—he calls them attack, tolerant indifference, and humanistic apology. The first tendency manifests itself as explicit denial of any validity to religious affirmations and in a reductive explanation of them through various factors in a natural environment; the second is to be found in the position which says, "Let us be tolerant. We can tolerate God as long as he does not become a public nuisance. Religion is a private affair" (p. 198); the third tendency is characterized as a disavowal of classical Christianity and a careful dissociation of religion in its "essence" from "those terrible medieval dogmas of sin and hell and atonement and the rest of those hard crusts and relics" (p. 199). The result of this tendency, according to Mueller, is that, under pressure of apology, the normative content of the Judeo-Christian tradition is lost and religion is reduced to what the "enlightened" mind of a time will accept.

Ways of approach similar to these, it is true, have been pointed out by other writers, but Mueller's position involves the further thesis that these three types all agree in treating "religion as a subjective fact or an experience of human consciousness" (p. 199). Since the expression "subjective fact" implies some sort of antithesis or polar distinction, what Royce would have called a "contrast-effect," it is necessary to make as clear as possible the nature of the contrast. Over against religion conceived in this subjective fashion, Mueller sets religion as a "faith-relation established by God" (p. 199) so that it stems from an

ultimate ground beyond man and his world. There can be no doubt that the emphasis on "experience," particularly in the classical British sense of "mental content" which has pervaded religious thought since the late nineteenth century has tended towards radical subjectivism. Under such an influence, the content of faith, *what* is believed in, is lost, and religion itself in the sense of a kind of *experiencing* comes to be taken as the object of faith. Granting that this is true, the fact remains that Mueller does not deal with the problems raised by the antithesis he has established and the radical distinction he draws between the paradoxes of the Bible and the natural and historical events of human experience which form their basis. He accepts too easily the idea that religious truth is revealed in terms which contradict and shock our human understanding, and he does not deal with the perplexing problems of how to pass from the natural and historical to God.

There is much more in *Dialectic* than I have been able to set forth. For those interested in concrete philosophy, it presents both much that is interesting and much that might well form the subject of further argument and discussion.

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The Self in Psychotic Process: Its Symbolization in Schizophrenia. By JOHN WEIR PERRY, M.D. (Foreword by C. G. JUNG.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953. viii, 158 pp. $5.00.

More than half of this book is devoted to the story of an individual recovery from schizophrenia; the other half presents a comprehensive survey of what is known about the symbolization of the self in Eastern and Western cultures. The decisive therapeutic initiative came from the suggestion: "Could you just show here your feeling of being at the center with the whole world around you, waiting?" The patient, a twenty-seven-year-old housewife, without artistic talent or education, was given colored crayons for this purpose. Although "at first she was somewhat nonplussed," she soon became fascinated with the design as a "picture of (her) ideas and feelings." The author stresses that "in no way was any suggestion made by the therapist as to what form to give to the images, though he did frequently encourage the patient to keep at her

task, since concentration (misprint for conversation?) tended to dissipate into chatter" (p. 12). On the conscious level the drawings were used simply as a special type of occupational therapy, more personalized than basket-weaving, but unconscious influences seem to account for the fact that the patient succeeded by means of twelve drawings in the course of nine weeks to integrate her personal problems with the deeper self. Her case is presented as paradigmatic for psychotic disturbances. The personal problems correspond to the individualized, unique side of the patient, whereas the self is of a collective nature and identified with the highest value of the culture in which a person lives, e.g., the sun god, the body of the highest Brahma, or Christ (p. 125). Psychosis is viewed as a process of ego inflation, inasmuch as the patient feels identified with the godhead; health as a state in which the individual contemplates the transcendent self through symbolic images such as the sun, the golden world egg, the Divine Child, or the Cross. It is a normal part of the personal development that the maturing individual should orientate itself by way of concrete *rites de passage* toward the "universal points of transition" of the "inward events of the archetypal process" (p. 117).

The imagery through which this patient gave concrete expression to her rebirth into health is analyzed extensively and correlated to the imagery which mankind has used the world over as a means of integrating the individual with the cosmic order. The excellent reproductions of the patient's drawings, and of anthropological material make a good case for Jung's basic contention that those forms are based on a common disposition of mankind for relating temporal, physical existence to the timeless, non-physical reality of the *numinosum*. That the psychiatrist did not give any interpretations or directions to the patient, however, is not a convincing argument. As Ehrenwald, in *Telepathy and Medical Psychology* (New York, 1948), has pointed out and this reviewer can confirm, the patient can know by extra-sensory perception what is going on in the mind of the therapist. This fact does not invalidate the essential "concept of an unconscious psyche with autonomous propensities toward self-representation, self-organization, and self-structuring" (p. 76). The individual could not form his or her individual variants of the collective symbol unless there were inherent capacities for such productions, just as physical nurture produces only those organic forms

for which the organism carries a hereditary predisposition. We also know that a patient does not accept ordinary or hypnotic suggestions unless they are compatible with his personality. It should be kept in mind that the autonomous aspects of the self appear somewhat overemphasized in this book for didactic purposes, as the dynamic interaction between patient and therapist had to be left in the dark of the unconscious relationship. Actually, the study of spontaneous therapeutic interrelationships is likely to increase our understanding of the collective forms of religious practice in which the worshiper and the priest are co-operating toward the health of the soul. It may be hoped that his future work will lead Dr. Perry to this one of the problems of the soul concealed in the symbolism of the self, " 'this knot (which) has grown so hard for want of being tried' (Dante)" (p. 77). Such development would probably help toward a greater rapprochement between the tendency toward esoteric individualism in Jungian practice and the tendency toward social interpersonalism in Freudian theory. Von Weizsaecker's work *(Der Gestaltkreis)* provides theoretical concepts pointing in this direction.

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BOOK NOTES

The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri: New Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. from the Jewish Colony of Elephantine. Edited by EMIL G. KRAELING. New Haven: Yale University Press, and London: Oxford University Press, 1953 (Publications of the Department of Egyptian Art, the Brooklyn Museum). xv, 319 pp. and 23 plates. $10.00.

During the first decade of the twentieth century scholars were excited by the publication of a number of Aramaic papyri found in Upper Egypt at Elephantine, a small island in the Nile river opposite Assuan or Syene. These proved to be documents relating to the affairs, chiefly legal and business, of a military colony of Jews in the service of the Persian government which ruled Egypt during the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries. From the references in the papyri to the religion of the colonists and their relations with Jerusalem as well as the Persian rulers and Egyptian neighbors, it was possible to write an almost entirely new chapter of Israelite history in the period of Nehemiah and Ezra.

Now, half a century after the first publication of an Elephantine papyrus, scholars have been surprised and delighted to learn that almost a score of new papyri of the same period and place were found in an old trunk belonging to their purchaser, the nineteenth century collector and amateur Egyptologist, Charles Edwin Wilbour, and were bequeathed to the Brooklyn Museum by his daughter in 1947. These additional papyri have been edited, translated, and interpreted by a very competent Semitist (as the reviewer, his former student at Columbia University, is glad to testify) who has had the wisdom to consult experts in other fields, such as Egyptology and Iranology, where problems outside Biblical and Aramaic philology have arisen. The result of his own work and that of his occasional collaborators is a model of scholarly accuracy and breadth.

It need hardly be said that the work contains much new and useful information about the law, economics, language, topography, and other aspects of the life of the Jewish community in Elephantine and the background of their history. But this review will be restricted to a brief consideration of the new material bearing on their religious history.

Through a careful analysis of archeological reports and of the topographical indications in the papyri, Kraeling has been able to establish that the temple of Yahu (destroyed by the local Egyptian priests) was located very close to the temple of the local Egyptian god Khnum. He has also clarified the nature of the "liberal" Judaism of the colonists, admitting the foreign accretions but not exaggerating the importance of these. Like Albright, he thinks of this religion as being "a symbiosis between heretical Yahwism and a syncretistic Aramaean cult rather than a fusion between the two." He doubts that the Jews worshipped Babylonian and Egyptian gods whose names appear in the papyri, since the persons calling upon these gods may be non-Jews or Jews obliged to use Egyptian legal forms under certain circumstances. As for the Canaanite goddesses, Eshembethel and Anathbethel, he suggests that the former was the

wife and the latter the daughter of Bethel, a god earlier known from Phoenician sources.

Kraeling, like some other scholars, thinks it certain that the Jews were authorized by Darius II in 419 B.C. to celebrate the festival of Unleavened Bread, but that Passover was not included, since its observance was then confined to Jerusalem, as prescribed in Deuteronomy. At the same time, he suggests that the Jews of Elephantine may earlier have observed a more primitive ritual of Passover, not requiring the sacrifice of a lamb, which would have provoked the followers of the god Khnum. On the whole he doubts that the colonists had much knowledge of Hebrew Scripture. As for the outbreak or "pogrom" instigated by the Egyptian priests and resulting in the destruction of the Jewish temple, Kraeling (like Kittel, whom he does not cite here) feels sure that it was motivated by political rather than religious feeling; that is to say, the Egyptians resented the loyalty of the Jews to the Persian rulers whom they several times tried to drive out.

The book will be of great value to the student of Israelite religion as well as to Semitists, archeologists and ancient historians generally. It is beautifully printed, provided with excellent facsimiles of the papyri and with helpful indices, and, above all, is written with great learning and sound judgment.

R. M.

Hellenistic Religions: The Age of Syncretism. By FREDERICK C. GRANT. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953. xxxix, 196 pp. $1.75.

This anthology of literary and epigraphic sources (translated chiefly from Greek, secondarily from Latin) for the religions of the Hellenistic and, by extension, Roman periods invites comparison with such works as Livingstone's *The Mission of Greece* and Edwyn Bevan's *Later Greek Religion*. On the whole, Professor Grant's book will be more useful to the student of popular Greek religion and of various aspects of Hellenistic syncretism because of its greater variety of selections, and because of its being very up to date and bibliographically more adequate than the older works.

After a 40-page introduction in which the editor skilfully outlines the essential characteristics of Hellenistic culture generally and Hellenistic religious syncretism in particular, there are four large sections subdivided as follows: I. Institutional Religion, (1) Sacred Histories, Foundations and Votive Offerings, (2) Sacred Laws: Rules for Priesthoods, Initiations and Sacrifices, (3) Religious Practices and Beliefs; II. The Criticism of Traditional Religion (Superstition, Euhemerism, Stoic Allegory, Charlatanism, Skepticism etc.); III. Cults, (1) Orphism, (2) Oriental Cults (Iranian and Syrian), (3) Egyptian Cults, (4) Attis and Mithras; IV. Religious Ideas of the Philosophers (Cleanthes, Epictetus, Epicurus, Diogenes of Oenoanda, Dio Chrysostom, Alexander, son of Numenius, Maximus of Tyre, Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblichus and Salustius). The omission of such fields as Hermeticism and Gnosticism is

due merely to the fact that the Library of Religion will contain separate volumes on these and other aspects of Greco-Roman religion, as well as on Judaism and Christianity.

In a book of fewer than 200 pages it is impossible to include all the selections that a group of teachers would like to see presented to their students, but the selection made by Professor Grant is as representative as any teacher could reasonably expect. The reviewer has noted very few points for querying. One is the statement (p. xxiv) that "an age of pseudo-science and superstition succeeded an age of faith, although the continued advance of medicine did something to light up the dismal scene." But surely Hellenistic scientists also made significant contributions in other fields, such as astronomy, mathematics, and physics. These might have been briefly discussed. Another suggestion is prompted by the translator's use of the word "sophist" to render Greek *sophistes* used of Jesus in Lucian's *Peregrinus*. A better rendering, the reviewer suggests, would be "doctor" or "Rabbi," as the word *sophistes* is rendered in Thackeray's translation of Josephus' *Jewish War*. But such queries are so few that the reviewer is glad to be able to welcome this little book as a valuable companion to classroom study.

R. M.

Repertorium Lexicographicum Graecum. By Harald and Blenda Riesenfeld. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup (Coniectanea Neotestamentica, XIV), 1953. 95 pp. Kr. 14.

This catalogue of indexes and dictionaries to Greek authors is an extremely useful bibliographical tool: there is an immense amount of lexicographical data buried in such indexes and dictionaries, and the serious scholar will, in any event, prefer to go to the sources rather than take someone's word at second or third hand. It is not necessary to add the Inscriptions—students will turn to the indices of Dittenberger and others, as a supplement to Riesenfeld. It is to be hoped that other supplements will follow, before long, e.g., an index to the new *Corpus Hermeticum* of Nock and Festugière.

F. C. Grant

Visva-Bharati Annals. Vol. V. Edited by P. C. Bagchi. Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1953. 242 pp. Rs 12.

Studies of Chinese Buddhist texts by Indian scholars continues apace under the able leadership of Dr. Bagchi at Santiniketan. This fifth volume of published results contains two works: (1) a translation from Chinese into Sanskrit of Bhadanta Ghosaka's *Abhidharmāmṛta*, by Shanti Bhikshu Śāstri; and (2) a translation from Chinese into English of the *Sāmmītinikaya Śastra*, by K. Venkataramanam. The Indian originals of both works have perished. Their recovery from the extant Chinese versions is consequently welcome. Readers of

Sanskrit but not of Chinese will be interested in the first. Readers of English but not of Chinese will appreciate the second.

Bhadanta Ghoṣaka was one of the four leading scholars who compiled the *Mahāvibhāṣā* commentary at the Fourth Council, during the reign of Kanishka (2nd century A.D.). His *Abhidharmāmṛta* reflects the Sarvāstivāda doctrine (realism) in that work, but, as both editor and translator point out, it also shows special interpretations wherein Ghosaka differs from the other three teachers.

The second work is the one philosophical treatise left by a Hīnayāna Buddhist school in North India, called Sāmmitīya, a name whose Chinese equivalent means "The School of Right Measure." The school is notable for its theory of a persistent self or personality surviving the destruction of the constituents (the five *skandhas*) of the individual at death, and clothing itself with subtle new constituents as it marches on toward a new rebirth. The self thus appears to be a patterned process, not a perdurable static entity which, while expressing itself through perishing physical and mental constituents, still maintains its self-conscious identity. Apparently we have here a protest against the completely negative interpretation of the early doctrine of *anatta* (or non-soul).

Students interested in the distinctions between early schools of Buddhist philosophy will find these two treatises significant. It is to be hoped that the Sanskrit translation of Ghoṣaka's work is to be followed by one in English.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

The Philosophy of the Teachings of Islam. By MIRZA GHULAM AHMAD. Washington, D. C.: The American Fazl Mosque, 1953. 199 pp. $3.50.

This book is an official publication of the Ahmadiyya movement, the author being the movement's revered founder. While the present publishers do not inform us of the fact, the book was previously printed by Luzac in 1910 under the title *The Teachings of Islam.* A careful examination of the two editions reveals only minor alterations in the present text. There is an occasional substitution of a better word or the choice of a happier phrase, but, for all practical purposes, this edition is the same as the one published by Luzac.

As to content the book consists of an address delivered by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad at Lahore in 1896. It serves to make available to those interested in modern Islamic sects source material concerning the Ahmadiyya movement, which was founded in 1889 and for a period had a kind of "modernizing" effect upon Islam in India. The movement is well known in the West, where it has been one of the most active organizations representing Islam. For a number of years this group has maintained centers and mosques in England and in America from which they have made their views known by the publication of periodicals, tracts, and books such as this one. Their American headquarters are at the American Fazl Mosque in Washington, D. C.

KERMIT SCHOONOVER

The Fundamentalist Controversy, 1918-1931. By NORMAN P. FURNISS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954, viii, 199 pp. $3.75.

Mr. Furniss has given us an interesting and careful account of a movement in American Protestantism in the 1920's which, measured in terms of emotional fervour and public attention, was of very considerable importance. It reached its climax in the famous Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee, in the summer of 1925, an event which Mr. Furniss uses to introduce us to his story. (And a colorful introduction it is, with accounts of Dayton stores offering for sale little stuffed cotton apes and celluloid pins with the slogan: "Your Old Man's a Monkey"!). Mr. Furniss specifically disavows any aim of analyzing Fundamentalist theology, probably a fortunate decision, but one which leaves unanswered the question of the religious and theological significance of the Fundamentalist movement. The author himself sees it as a defensive movement concerned with maintaining "inherited doctrines and ways of life" in the face of new and corrosive ideas and movements of thought. But conservatism in theology is not necessarily Fundamentalism, a fact which is not always made clear in this treatment. References to the doctrinal controversies of Bishop William T. Manning with some of his modernist clergy are included in the book, for example, despite the fact that the author correctly points out that the Bishop was no Fundamentalist.

The main currents of American Protestant theology seem now to be flowing in a conservative direction (defining conservative as an attempt to take tradition seriously), and yet the leaders of this theology bear little or no resemblance to the sort of fundamentalist so clearly delineated in Mr. Furniss's chapter on "The Characteristics of the Fundamentalists." He lists these characteristics as "violence in thought and language"; ignorance and illiteracy often taking the form of anti-intellectualism (Bryan is quoted as saying that "it is better that we know 'The Rock of Ages' than that we know the age of rocks"); and an egotism which casts the Fundamentalist in the role of the defender of eternal truth against a wicked and perverse infidel. Fundamentalism of this sort is not just a concern for traditional theological doctrine. It is rather a manifestation of a perennial temptation of the religious spirit to substitute fanaticism for a humble and self-critical faith. Mr. Furniss has given us a number of suggestions as to why the immediate post-World War I atmosphere was conducive to an organized outburst of such fanaticism, but he nowhere suggests that the optimism and superficiality of the so-called Modernist preaching and teaching were in themselves inadequate representations of Christian tradition and so fair game for the Fundamentalist attack.

JOHN M. KRUMM

Frederick Augustus Rauch, American Hegelian. By HOWARD J. B. ZIEGLER. Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Franklin and Marshall College, 1953. xvii, 103 pp.

In 1832, after experiencing certain frustrations in the course of his early career in his native Germany, Frederick Augustus Rauch migrated to the

United States. In this country, he was successful from the first. Following a brief period as a faculty member of Lafayette College, he was appointed the first principal of the High School operated in conjunction with the Seminary of the German Reformed Church; and, when the High School was shortly thereafter incorporated as Marshall College, Rauch became its first president. In this period, he also taught theology at the Seminary and published, in addition to various lesser pieces, one major work, *Psychology*. After these few productive years, in 1841, at the age of thirty-four, Rauch died.

This commemorative volume, after a detailed account of Rauch's life, goes on to present an analysis of the *Psychology* and of the theological controversy to which that work led. Reviewing the work in 1842, one James Murdock, sometime professor in the Andover Theological Seminary, attacked Rauch as " 'a *Transcendentalist* and a *Pantheist* of the school of Hegel ' " (p. 75). This criticism "must have reflected most unfavorably upon the fitness of Rauch as Professor in a Christian Seminary and a College President" (p. 76), and to counter its ill-effects, E. V. Gerhart, a student and follower of Rauch, in 1856, published a "scholarly criticism and plausible refutation of Dr. Murdock's review" (p. 77). In his re-examination of the issues involved in this controversy, the author of the present volume, Mr. Ziegler, adds his voice to Rauch's support.

Mr. Ziegler acknowledges, in fact, he demonstrates, that Rauch was of the "school of Hegel," but he finds that this only supports, rather than brings into question, Rauch's orthodoxy. In this regard, Rauch must be counted with certain others among his German contemporaries who found in Hegelianism "a fundamental affinity with Christianity such as no other philosophy ever possessed" (p. 82). Apart from this conclusion, the present work is noteworthy for its complete documentation of Rauch's life and its careful summation and analysis of the *Psychology*. It may be of general interest that the *Psychology* represents one of the earliest introductions of a systematic Hegelianism into American thought.

EUGENE D. MAYERS

Brownson on Democracy and the Trend Toward Socialism. By LAURENCE ROEMER. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xvi, 173 pp. $3.75.

Seldom can there have been a man whose thinking reversed itself more radically than that of Orestes A. Brownson. In 1840, in his essay-review of Carlyle's "Chartism," Brownson produced a call to violent revolution on behalf of "The Laboring Classes." Yet by 1844 he had given up all hopes of a political solution to the ills of the world and had entered the fellowship of the Roman Catholic Church. His views on democracy changed to the point where he maintained that except the American republic become, as he had, devoutly Catholic, it could only degenerate. One part, and it is the valuable part of Mr. Roemer's little book, is devoted to documenting Brownson's post-conversion views on the nature of government (largely from other sources than *The American Re-*

public, which Roemer insists is not Brownson's best work). For the rest, Mr. Roemer tries desperately and unsuccessfully to tie Brownson to the current twentieth century anti-Communist line of Roman Catholic political thought. It is a pity that Roemer felt it necessary to confuse two types of piety.

J. L. B.

Christian Faith and Social Action. Ed. by JOHN HUTCHISON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. vii, 246 pp. $3.50.

This volume is a fitting monument to a movement formerly known as the Frontier Fellowship. For most of its history, the movement was actually known as the Fellowship of Socialist Christians. It never accepted a doctrinaire socialist position, and when the term socialist no longer had any positive meaning in American life, the group changed its name. More recently the Fellowship disbanded, and its members became part of a broader movement known as Christian Action. The preparation of this book coincided with the decision to disband the Frontier Fellowship.

The history of the movement is delineated in the opening chapter by John Hutchison. There follow chapters which relate the Gospel to the broad problem of history and culture. These are followed by two chapters on the nature of the church and its position in society. There are chapters on the foundation of ethics, on vocation, and on individuals in a technical society. There are also two chapters on Christianity and what it has to say about problems of foreign policy, and one chapter on education. Finally there are two essays which deal with the nature of social problems in general.

The general thesis which runs through the great variety of essays is that there is no single or final solution to social and political problems, but that Christianity provides resources for understanding life, and the power and courage to act significantly in the midst of difficult decisions. The Christian faith which informs this volume rejects both cynicism and idealism. Economically it rejects complete laissez-faire as well as collectivism, and politically it rejects totalitarianism either of the right or of the left. Though the book represents a minority outlook in the churches, it represents, nevertheless, the most creative thought on the relationship of Christianity to the cultural scene that one finds in America.

J. D.

The Christian Approach to Culture. By EMILE CAILLIET. New York-Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953. 288 pp. $3.75.

This book, like most of those by Professor Cailliet, shows every mark of his vast learning and erudition. The author covers anthropology, literature, and philosophy and offers a Christian critique of all three. He does this by noting

points of convergence and divergence and calls for a creative relation in each instance.

The difficulty of the book resides in the scope of the undertaking. I am no judge of Professor Cailliet's mastery of the many subjects upon which he touches, but it is evident that the relation of Christianity to culture is neither convincingly nor clearly delineated. One receives the impression of a man who knows very much and would like to relate it in a comprehensive picture, but finds difficulty in carrying out his plan. Some of the connections are indeed far-fetched.

Professor Cailliet is not alone in being dissatisfied with much of the history of philosophy, but it does seem to me to be too much to speak of most of the history of philosophy as an ontological deviation inaugurated by Plato. Almost as in liberal theology, Plato is to Socrates as Paul is to Jesus. In each instance the disciple is the distorter of the master. In the place of metaphysical speculation, a term which is increasingly utilized to spank most of the philosophical tradition, Professor Cailliet wishes to substitute the concept of person and personality. This is laudable enough, but one would like to see the proponents of "person" become more articulate. Further, Professor Cailliet believes that such an approach ought to be connected with the newer views in science. Here again one wishes that Professor Cailliet had spelled out more precisely what he meant. I gather from this book that Christianity has not yet approached culture.

J. D.

The Kingdom of God: The Biblical Concept and Its Meaning for the Church. By JOHN BRIGHT. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1953. 288 pp. $3.75.

A popular book by a biblical scholar which succeeds in avoiding condescension and mediocrity is always a publishing event. When that same book plunges boldly into a central biblical theme and does it justice in short scope, we have a highly significant work.

In the opinion of the reviewer, Bright adopts all the proper presuppositions for his study: that the notion of the rule of God in history, i.e., the kingdom of God, is the binding element in the Bible; that the idea itself is far broader than the term; that the Kingdom can neither be equated with ancient Israel nor with the organized Christian Church; that the faith is so organically related to the history that no mere treatment of isolated passages can suffice, and we are thus led to a reconsideration of the entire biblical history. Bright then proceeds to unfold the fascinating interplay of politics, economics, literature, and religion which marked the biblical course of events. This he does with a remarkable facility for succinctness and with turns of phrase that constantly stir the imagination.

One of the commendable features of the book is its incorporation of the results of biblical scholarship without overwhelming or sidetracking the reader.

The scholar will be drawn to the footnotes, where the author has confined most discussion of controversial points. The reader will not have gone far before he discovers that John Bright is definitely a conservative critic and that he is heavily in debt, as we should expect, to his teacher William Foxwell Albright. At point after point the judgments of the great archeologist are accepted, e.g., that Moses was a true monotheist; that the north Israelite tribal center was Shiloh (and not Shechem); that the bulls set up by Jeroboam I at Bethel and Dan were simply the pedestals of imageless Yahweh thrones and not idols. Bright is generally fair, however, in informing the reader of alternative viewpoints, and, in a book which is not primarily critical in nature, nothing more can be asked.

From the first page the Christian stance of the author is apparent. Yet his rejection of all arbitrary "Christianizing" of the Old Testament is emphatic. He believes that the story of Old Testament faith—and unfaith—unadulterated and "with no punches pulled," as we would say, is the only perspective from which to understand the New Testament. Thus he lets the Old Testament tell its own story, believing that, when it is read on its own terms, it is incomplete and therefore leads on irresistibly and of necessity to the events of the New Testament.

The final chapter on the present function of the Christian Church will not only be a disconcerting stimulus to the thinking Christian, but may well be read by anyone who wishes to see a Protestant position which is neither orthodoxy nor liberalism, but which takes seriously both the requirements of historical criticism and the reality of revelation as a dynamic call to commitment. This chapter is a scathing indictment of the weakness and perverseness of the Christian Church, but it is not a cry of bitter disillusion. It is a prophetic summons.

NORMAN GOTTWALD

The Great Tradition of the American Churches. By WINTHROP S. HUDSON. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. 282 pp. $3.75.

At this time, when a sort of godly materialism seems to be the most pervasive attitude among members and ministers of Protestant churches, when not a single voice has been raised in the Protestant camp against the blasphemous prostitution of the name of God to the political ambitions of the Republican party, when the nineteenth century attempt to "put God in the Constitution" by a "Christian amendment" has been revived along with nineteenth century economic doctrines—at this time it is good to read and to reflect over the ideas and the historical evidence in Professor Hudson's important little book. From the very heart of the traditional Protestant faith, Hudson looks out at the churches and the social order. His prophetic witness agrees with extreme spokesmen for statism in rejecting any alliance of church and state; but where they reject alliance to keep the state free, he rejects it to keep the

church pure. His is Roger Williams' view of separation, not Thomas Jefferson's.

But to focus attention on this book as a contribution to the now flourishing church and state literature is to do Hudson an injustice. This is but a small part of what he has done. More important to him, and in the last analysis to us, is that Hudson wishes to protect the American Protestant churches against themselves by recalling them to the "great tradition," a tradition of faith and freedom. The unique character of the faith depended upon the freedom; because every church member *chose* to become one and *was chosen* by his fellows, because "the voluntary principle in religion" was "an axiom of all Americans," the church differed from the world. Once the church opened its doors to everyone, as happened—so Hudson believes—sometime about the end of the nineteenth century, with the "New Theology," which was no theology at all, but a moralistic substitute for theology, the churches no longer could be distinguished from the society about them. If man is, as the New Theology so often said, naturally religious, then what special function does a church have in society? "With the fading of a sense of distinctive vocation, church life inevitably begins to languish. As the vigor and vitality of the churches decline, the pressure to call upon the state for help becomes almost irresistible" (p. 10).

There is a solid hard-rock fact upon which Professor Hudson builds. It is that if a church—*any* church—is to be taken seriously, it must first be taken seriously by its members. If a church claims to be different, it must make a difference. This is so obvious that it is never stated. Hudson asserts, I think rightly, that there is no such church in America. He refers to a survey that "could find no basis for a clear-cut line of division, beyond the simple fact of church affiliation, which would serve to distinguish the unchurched from the churched portions of the population" (p. 248). In essence, and I apologize to Professor Hudson if the statement is too crude, what he is saying is that, unless churches are religious institutions, it is most unlikely that their members will be religious individuals, and adding that, by and large, our churches have lost the sense of what it means to be religious institutions.

My major difficulty with this book is that Professor Hudson seems to me to place the beginnings of decay too late. Decay began in the seventeenth century; it became dominant early in the nineteenth century when evangelicalism dominated the churches. Hudson does not realize that for most if not all revivalists, it was the size of the bag that was important; that quantitative standards of success were being applied in estimating the good revivals were doing; that the difference between revivalists in the early nineteenth century and our Billy Grahams and Fulton Sheens is one of technology only. Otherwise I find myself completely in agreement with Hudson's thesis that the only pure church must be one that is distinct from the world, and that there is no such thing as a slightly impure church.

Hudson is altogether right in his insistence that "If the members of a church do not believe in their own Gospel sufficiently to take it seriously, they can scarcely expect the world outside to do it" (p. 250). No matter what our pledge

of allegiance may say, no matter how many times Christ is mentioned in the Constitution, the "Christianity" of our country is tested not by these things, but by how our leaders act when it comes to censuring the Junior Senator from Wisconsin. The test of a religion that counts is that its members be ready to stand up and be counted.

J. L. B.

Ways of Faith: An Introduction to Religion. By JOHN A. HUTCHISON and JAMES A. MARTIN, JR. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953. v, 511 pp. $4.50.

Ways of Faith is another attempt to provide a textbook for a first college course in religion. This is a difficult enterprise to carry out satisfactorily. The major difficulty is that the introductory course must tackle (if very superficially) a wide variety of problems in order to lay a foundation for advanced study, and at the same time give a unified overview of the field of religion as an academic discipline for students who will, in all likelihood, take only the introductory course. When, in one course or one text, materials for the history, psychology, sociology, and philosophy of religion must all be introduced and somehow ordered, and in the same course or text the personal religious problems of college students be somehow approached, the difficulty is well-nigh insurmountable.

Hutchison and Martin have done a fairly good job in *Ways of Faith* by taking the historical development of a group of major faiths as the basic pattern of organization and introducing other materials as necessary in the course of historical discussion. Where so much ground is covered, the dependence of the authors on secondary sources leads to many minor inaccuracies, none of which is important enough in itself to vitiate the work, but which in sum might cause an instructor contemplating adoption of *Ways of Faith* as a text to reconsider. The final chapter, "Old Ways and New Directions," reveals the philosophical interests of both authors, and includes an interesting attempt to find a justification of religion in the face of present-day philosophic skepticism.

J. L. B.

Sex Ethics and the Kinsey Reports. By SEWARD HILTNER. New York: Association Press, 1953. ix, 238 pp. $3.00.

The Kinsey Reports have produced a plethora of comment, from psychologists, philosophers, sociologist, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, etc. Not the least vocal of the numerous commentators have been the moralists, the clergymen, and the theologians. On the whole, these men of the cloth have "breathed out threatenings and slaughter" engaging in figurative, if not literal, book-burn-

ings. It is somewhat refreshing to encounter the present volume, which goes so far in the opposite direction that the reviewer is inclined to reproach the author for taking Kinsey's statistics too unqualifiedly!

Writing from a background of considerable experience in the field of counseling and psychotherapy, Seward Hiltner begins with a presentation of the Christian view of sex both past and present. He then proceeds to give an excellent survey of Kinsey's method and findings. The lazy reader can save himself considerable time by reading Chapters 3-7 of Hiltner. This is followed by an analysis of some of the present-day attitudes toward sex and a criticism of them from the Christian point of view. The volume concludes with the implications of Kinsey's findings for Christian teaching and practice in the realm of sexual ethics.

The over-all philosophy and viewpoint which illumine the treatment throughout are sane, balanced, and happily lacking in self-righteous moralism. Hiltner's training and experience as psychotherapist liberate him from passing stern judgment on deviations from accepted moral standards, yet his concern as Christian and teacher deliver him from the complete relativism elicited in many quarters by the Kinsey Reports. He brings about a happy blending of New Testament and modern psychological insights, seeking to understand morality from the point of view of the dynamics of individual needs, rather than under the dominance of legal codes. Such an approach should go far to disabuse the minds of many moderns that Christianity is in essence moralistic and ascetic.

The only criticisms the present reviewer would make are three: (1) The style is a little inclined to "breeziness," a kind of slap-dash journalese; (2) the historical section on biblical and theological backgrounds is extremely cursory; and (3) as indicated above, the author is a little over-generous in his acceptance of Kinsey's findings. There are numerous caveats entered against Kinsey's method and results from a purely scientific point of view, by statisticians no less than by sexologists. More note might have been taken of the limitations of Kinsey's studies. But the faults are minor. The book as a whole is a valuable contribution to the problems of sexual morality in the twentieth century.

WILLIAM GRAHAM COLE

The Study of Human Nature. By DAVID LINDSAY WATSON. Yellow Springs: Antioch Press, 1953. 262 pp. $3.50.

Dr. David L. Watson's thought in *The Study of Human Nature* is a fine example of the disorientation which often occurs when a specialist loses faith in Specialism. As such an example, the work may merit a few remarks. In the attempt to comprehend man, Dr. Watson holds, "You will learn most by reflecting on your own personal experiences of men and of yourself. You must draw your own conclusions without being distracted by the books or the professors"

(p. 234). A few pages later, he tells us that the problem of man may even be "metaphysical, aesthetic, ethical, and, in the best sense, theological" (p. 243). However, in his rural retreat, Dr. Watson shuns the books and the professors, preferring instead, "sugar maples, dainty pink laurel blossoms, and swaying grasses whose incredible perfection of form and color stirs a deep joy in the soul—alert, nibbling rabbits, wood-thrush musical artists, and lovely butterflies. When it rains or snows, a week may pass without my getting any fresh data on 'human nature' other than my own. *Yet nowhere have I learned more about the nature of man*" (p. 242).

The foregoing passage was written from Dr. Watson's hermitage, "a green and fragrant solitude in the woods." From this location, he also advises us as follows: "Park the intellectual difficulties then. Relax, and let the Sermon on the Mount sing to you, like the *Eroica* or the *Messiah*" (p. 253). Taking Dr. Watson's counsel, one might appropriately be rewarded with a discourse on humanity such as Dr. Watson's: "What we call 'human nature' is the meaningful distillate of the performances of an organism having complex physical and chemical structure, subject to a manifold dependence on its material and natural environment, and working all the time within the framework of potent biological patterns" (p. 215. Footnote). But aside from laurel blossoms and the *Messiah,* for the term "human" in the preceding description could one not substitute such other terms as "chimpanzee" or "kangaroo" or "chipmunk"?

For his study of human nature, Dr. Watson needs to forsake the nibbling rabbits and lovely butterflies and bend his steps back to the professors and the books.

J. R. Simmons

A.T.L.A. Index to Religious Periodical Literature, 1949-1952. Ed. by J. Stillson Judah. Chicago: American Theological Library Association, 1953. ix, 220 pp. Paper, $5.00; Cloth, $6.00.

This index should prove very useful to students of religion, particularly for the reason that the thirty-one periodicals indexed are not included in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* nor the *International Index to Periodicals.* Also, it is, naturally, a great advantage to have the contents of so many of the leading religious journals concentrated in one volume.

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. XXII. 1953. New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1953. xxxvi, 168 pp. $5.00. (Sole selling agent, Bloch Publishing Company.)

Among the learned articles contained in this volume, there are four which should be of special interest to the student of religion: VI, "Azarbaijan in Jewish History," by Walter J. Fischel; VII, "The Distribution of Land and Sea

on the Earth's Surface According to Hebrew Sources," by Solomon Gandz; X, "The Ascension of Phinehas," by Abram Spiro; and XII, "Isaac Arama on the Creation and Structure of the World," by Sarah Heller-Wilensky.

Missionary Methods: St. Paul's or Ours? By ROLAND ALLEN. (3rd ed.) London: World Dominion Press, 1953. xxiv, 230 pp. 6*s*.

This work by an Anglican missionary in North China has been a classic in its field for over forty years. The author's main point is that St. Paul had faith in the indigenous churches and, because he trusted the Holy Ghost to guide them, he was willing to give them full autonomy at once. We trust neither our converts nor the Holy Ghost! The book is a sharp criticism of our handling of problems relating to the heathen religions, to finance, and to the training of native leadership. The reasons for our failure lie in religious and racial pride, sectarianism, and fear of native independence.

The Writings of St. Luke. By ROLAND KOH. Hongkong: Diocesan Committee, 1953. 91 pp. 3*s*-6*d*.

An interesting study of the Third Gospel by a Chinese parish priest, with a Foreword by R. O. Hall, Bishop of Hongkong. Mr. Koh makes use of the best modern biblical studies at his disposal to prove the historical reliability of Luke, and the author's belief that the Gospel of Luke was written after the Book of Acts, about the year 50, before Luke's arrival at Caesarea in 58.

The Mind's Road to God. By SAINT BONAVENTURA. Tr. by GEORGE BOAS. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953. xxi, 46 pp. $.50.

This new translation of the great Franciscan mystic appears as No. 32 in The Library of Liberal Arts, under the general editorship of Oskar Piest. In his Introduction, Professor Boas describes this work as "one of the shorter masterpieces of medieval philosophy. It sets forth in a very few pages a whole system of metaphysics; it illustrates a philosophical method; it typifies the thinking of one of the great monastic orders of the West; it stands at the beginning of Renaissance science as one of those documents in which the future can be seen in germ."

Lord, Hear My Prayer. By SHIRLEY C. HUGHSON, O.H.C. West Park, N. Y.: Holy Cross Press, 1953. 200 pp. $3.00.

A book of meditations on the Collects in *The Book of Common Prayer* appointed for Sundays and special holy days of the liturgical year, by the late

Superior of the Order of the Holy Cross. Father Hughson occupied a unique position in the Protestant Episcopal Church as the chief spokesman for the Anglo-Catholic monastic movement. He was the author of a great number of tracts and devotional works in the Catholic ascetic tradition.

The Cherubic Wanderer. By Angelus Silesius. Tr. by Willard R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc. 61 pp. $2.00.

"Angelus Silesius" is the pseudonym of a Silesian mystic of the seventeenth century, Johannes Scheffler—born a Lutheran and converted to Catholicism in his twenty-ninth year. Here we have 140 of his short, epigrammatic verses, written with a poet's highly sophisticated skill to convey the mystic's ecstatic experience of union with the Absolute. The monistic character of the symbolism reminds one of Sufi mysticism, as in the following:

I am God's other self;
he findeth but in me
His equal and his like
for all eternity.

The Transcendent Unity of Religions. By Frithjof Schuon. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc. 199 pp. $3.50.

The author has received high praise from the late A. K. Coomaraswamy, as well as from T. S. Eliot, as an authentic interpreter of religions Eastern and Western. He places himself in the school of René Guénon, another famous exponent of the *philosophia perennis.* The thesis here expounded is no new idea, being well-known the theosophical teaching that religions differ only in their externals, but are the same in their esoteric, transcendental aspects, but considerable originality and ingenuity have used in its development. One rather odd feature of the book is the fact that the footnotes (to this reviewer) are far more interesting than the text! Possibly because they are more historical and factual, and less "metaphysical."

The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. By René Guénon. London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1953. 363 pp. 25*s.*

This is an English translation by Lord Northbourne of a work which appeared in French in 1945 as a kind of "doctrinal" supplement to the author's *La Crise du Monde moderne.* The book is a treatise in the traditional metaphysics of Hindu thought, in which time is regarded as cyclic, and our present era the worse of all possible worlds, the final period of the *Kali-Yuga,* the black age of dissolution at the end of the *kalpa.* An obvious manifestation of this

disintegration is the domination of the "spiritual" East by the "materialistic" West, with its "pseudo-science" based on mathematics, its statistics, its glorification of mere size, its mechanization. The Orient is succumbing to this general degradation by accepting Western science. (It has always been difficult for this reviewer to see the "spiritual" superiority of a wooden plow over a tractor, but perhaps that is a limitation of the typical *Kali-Yuga* mentality!) This is indeed a strange book to be written by a Frenchman and in the twentieth century.

The Force of Women in Japanese History. By MARY R. BEARD. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953. 196 pp. $3.75.

In her preface, the author states that the material here presented was collected in Tokyo in the years 1935-1939, by a committee composed mostly of Japanese members of college faculties. With the coming of war, all independent historical research came to an end. In a brief review, it is impossible to deal with a book so packed with mythological and historical detail, but perhaps a listing of a few of the chapter headings will convey some idea of its scope: Ch. 1, Supreme Deity: Ama-terasu-o-mi-kami; Ch. 3, Imperial Rule by Women; Ch. 6, Women of the Middle Ages; Ch. 7, Women Help Restore Imperial Rule; Ch. 10, Ballots for Women. The book loses a great deal of its value as a reference work by the lack of documentation, and a good deal of its readability by its multiplicity of detail. But, nevertheless, it should serve at least one useful purpose. It should dispel once and for all the popular Western myth of the Japanese woman as a charming doll, helpless and totally subservient to her lord and master. There seems to be another side to the story!

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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